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IMPACfS OF SCHOOL ORGANIZATION AND SIGNALLING ON
INCENTIVES TO LEARN IN
FRANCE, ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, THE NETHERLANDS
AND THE UNITED STATES
Despite similar cultural roots and standards of living, the secondary education systems
of France, the Netherlands, England, Scotland and the United States produce remarkably
different levels of achievement in mathematics and science. When one examines
achievement at a given age. the French and Dutch have learned the most. Americans the
least and the British are somewhere in between. In reading ability, however, the students
of the five countries are roughly equal. High achievement in France and the Netherlands
has not been achieved by pushing slow students out of upper secondary school. The. ratios
of upper secondary students to the age cohort are as high in France and tbe Netherlands
as in the U.S. and far ahead of England and Scotland. What accounts for this pattern?
I. DIFFERENTIALS IN ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT
The differences in achievement levels at age 13, 14 and 15 are summarized in Table
1. The table presents data from studies conducted in tbe 1980s and 1990s comparing
France, the Netherlands, England, Scotland and the United States.
Mathematics: In the 1981/82 study of mathematics achievement of 13-14 year aIds
conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
(lEA), Dutch and French 13-14year aIds ranked number 2 and 3 in the world (behind only
Japan). Of the 17 industrialized nations participating in the study of 13-14 year aIds,
Americans were ranked 12th, English 11th and Scots lOth.1 After adjustment for small
differences in mean age, American 14year aIds scored about 40 percent of a U.S. standard
deviation (or roughly 1.3 U.S. grade level equivalent) below French and Dutch students of
comparable age.
The 1991 International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) mathematics
study obtained similar results. The gap between French and American 13 year aIds was 45
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percent of a U.S. standard deviation (about 1.5 U.S. grade level equivalents).2
The performance gap between the American and European students grows even
larger during upper secondary school. Evidence of this can be found in Table 2. The
Americans who participated in the Second International Math Study were high school
seniors in college preparatory math courses like trigonometry, precalculus and calculus. This
very select group, representing 13 percent of American 17-18year olds, got 39.8 percent of
the questions correct. Scottish students who were one year younger on average and who
represented 18 percent of their age cohort got 42.8 percent correct. The 6 percent of
English students studying mathematics at A level got 59.8 percent correct. lEA data on
achievement in mathematics and science is not available for French and Dutch students
completing secondary school. However, substantial proportions of the age cohort specialize
in mathematics and science (20percent of French youth are in the mathematics and science
lines known as C, D or E of the /ycee general) and the questions they are asked on their
final examinations suggest tbat these students achieve at a very high level. In place of data
on our target nations, Table 2 presents data on Belgium and Finland. Achievement levels
clearly exceeded those in the U.S. by a wide margin (McKnight et al 1987).
Science: In the 1983 lEA study of science achievement of 14-15 year olds,
Netherlands ranked 3rd and the U.S. ranked dead last among 17 industrialized countries.
After a rough adjustment for age differences, American students lagged slightly more than
a half a standard deviation (about two U.S. grade level equivalents) behind Dutch students.
The raw data on achievement place the English 15th in tbe ranking, but tbeir tested students
were younger than in most other countries. Adjusting for age differences, England falls in
the middle of the 17 industrialized countries and about one-quarter of an SD above
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American students.3 lJ
The 1991 IAEP science study of 13 year olds also found that U.S. students were
behind English, Scotch and French students, but the differences were small and not
statistically significant.4
Few American high school students study science in depth (see Table 2). Only 1 or
2 percent of the age cohort take two years of physics or two years of chemistry. Despite the
highly selected nature of this group (many of whom were taking the subject for Advanced
1
I
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Placement college credit), only 47.5 percent of the questions were answered correctly on the
lEA physics exam and only 37.7 percent were correct on the lEA chemistry exam. The 4
or 5 percent of the age cohort of English youth who in their 13th year of schooling were
studying these subjects for their A levels got 62.4 percent and 69.3 percent correct
respectively. Even larger shares of the age cohort study these subjects in Finland and
Norway and these students perform quite creditably. For example, the 16 percent of Finns
taking chemistry knew almost as much chemistry as the highly selected group of Americans
studying the subject (Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992).
Reading: Two studies have been conducted which compare the reading ability of
students in these nations. Robert Thorndike's study of reading comprehension in 1971
found that American 14 yea.t: olds were equal to the Scottish students and about one-fifth
of a U.S. standard deviation better than English and Dutch students. With respect to word
knowledge, however, Dutch students were about one-fifth of an SD above American
students who in turn were 10 to 16 percent of an SD above the British students.s
In the 1990/91 IEA study of reading achievement, French 9th graders ranked second
among 23 industrialized countries, substantially above American and Dutcp students. These
results are misleading, however, because the French ninth graders were 1.1 year older than
the Dutch eighth graders studied and .4 years older than the American ninth graders
studied. Elley (1992) has carefully adjusted the reading scores for age differences and
shown that many of the differences between countries are age related. Using his adjusted
scores, American students clearly were reading significantly better than Dutch and French
students at age 9. However, by age 14 there were only trivial differences between the three
countries (see column 3 of Table 1) and the U.S ranks 14th (and France 9th) among the 23
industrialized nations.6
II. TEACHER QUALI1Y, TIME, AND ENGAGEMENT:
The Proximate Causes of Achievement Differentials
What causes these large differences in achievement at the end .ofsecondary school.
This section of the paper examines the proximate causes of the achievement differentials.
I conclude that these achievement differentials are caused by differences in the quality of
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teacher inputs and the quality and quantity of student time and effort inputs. There
remains, however, tbe question of why the students, teachers, parents and school
administrators of different countries behave so differently? Why, for example, is student
engagement in learning lower in the U.S. than in France and The Netherlands? These
issues will be tackled in Section m.
The discussion of the proximate causes of higher achievement of Dutch and French
students is organized around five topics--each of them a proposed explanation of
achievement differentials across countries:
0
N
a
b
Sl
.r-
2
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Restricted access to secop.dary education
Expenditure per pupil
Teacher quality and salaries
Time devoted to instruction and study
Engagement--Effort per unit of scheduled time
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2.1 Access--Numbers of Students and Graduates
It is sometimes said that low achievement is the price one must pay for greater
access. Thirty years ago American youth were considerably more likely to complete upper
secondary school than French and Dutch youth. This is no longer the case. Table 3
presents comparative data on the proportion of youth who are participating in and
completing secondary education. In 1988/89 the ratio of upper secondary students to
population of the theoretical age group was 91.1 percent in the Netherlands, 84.9 percent
in France, 76.9 percent in the United Kingdom and 90.2 percent in the United States.
Enrollment rates for 17 and 18year olds had a similar pattern. Enrollment rates for France,
the Netherlands and the United States were similar and dramatically higher than for the
United Kingdom. The ratio of secondary school diplomas awarded to population was 84.5
percent for France,. 56.9 percent for the Netherlands and 65.1 percent for the United
Kingdom. Despite the minimal standards for getting a diploma in the United States, the
ratio of secondary school diplomas awarded to population 18 years of age was 73.7 percent
in 1988, slightly below its level in 1968.7 Standards were lowered in the 1970s, but access
did not improve. Only the United Kingdom exhibits the expected tradeoff between access
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and achievement. The students preparing for A level exams achieve at a very high level,
but they represent a decided minority of the age cohort. Thus, differences in access to
secondary school do not account for the differences in achievement between the France, the
Netherlands and the U.S.
2.2 School Expenditures
Teachers are more expensive in America than in Europe because college graduates
(the pool of workers from which teachers must be drawn) are better paid in the U.S. Since
labor compensation accounts for the bulk of education costs, the proper deflator for
schoolingexpenditure is not a general costof livingindex,but a wage index that reflects the
cost of recruiting competent teachers. In the absence of such an index, deflation by GDP
per worker is the next best thing. GECD's estimates of the ratio of public expenditure on
secondary education per student to GDP per capita and GDP per worker are given in Table
4. Expenditure per student deflated by GDP per worker is higher in the U.S. than in
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Even with a correct deflator, however, expenditure would be a problematic indicator
of real public investment in academic instruction. Countries differ in how they budget
school costs and assign schools different functions some of which have little to do with
academic instruction.s American schools often perform functions such as after school
sports, bus transportation, psychological counseling, medical check ups, after school day care,
hot meals, and driver education that many other countries assign to other institutions. Costs
of transportation are generally not included in school budgets in Japan and Europe where
students use the public transportation system to go to school. In many European countries
afler-school sports are sponsored and organized by local government, not the school. This
removes the capital costs of extensive school-based sports facilities and the salaries of
coaches and maintenance personnel from the school budget. The additional functions
performed by American schools are one of the reasons why non teaching staff account for
a much larger share of employment in U.S. public education than in most other countries
(see row 3 of Table 4, GECD 1992Table P9.e). If adjustments were made for service mix
and a cost of education index reflecting compensation levels in alternative college level
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occupations were used to deflate expenditure, the U.S. advantage in spending per pupil
would probably drop somewhat but not enough to change the basic picture. Lower overall
spending levels are not the reason why American achievement levels are below those in
Northern Europe.
American education budgets are spent differently than European education budgets.
Computers are more plentiful and physical facilities are generally better. Libraries are
larger and textbooks more colorful and up to date. In part, this reflects the fact that books,
computers and buildings are cheaper (relative to teachers of constant quality) in the United
States. Student-teacher ratios in U.S. secondary schools, however, are close to the OECD
average. They are below those in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom but above
those in France (see row 4 of Table 4).
What is unique about the way Americans organize and budget their schools is the
heavy investment in nonteaching staff and the relatively low levels of teacher compensation.
Nonteachers account for one half of the employees in public education in the U.S.
Nonteachers account for less than one-fifth of employees in the Netherlands and only 26
percent of employees in France (see row 4 Table 4).9
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2.3 Teacher Quality and Compensation
The quality of the people recruited into teaching is very important. The teacher
characteristic that most consistently predicts student learning are tests assessing the teacher's
general academic ability and subject knowledge (Hanushek 1971; Strauss and Sawyer 1986;
Ferguson 1990, Ehrenberg and Brewer 1993, Monk 1992).
Secondary school teaching is not a prestige occupation in the United States and it
apparently does not attract the kind of talent that is attracted into the profession in France
and the Netherlands. Since minimum standards for admission to university are considerably
higher in Europe, the university graduate pool from which European secondary school
teachers are recruited is better educated on average than the college graduate pool out of
which American teachers are recruited. Furthermore, American teachers are generally not
the most talented members of the pool of college graduates. In 1977-78 the Math SAT of
intended education majors was 46 points below the overall average, 118 points below
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engineering majors and 144points below majors in the physical sciences. The Verbal SAT
of intended education majors was 33 points below the overall average, 32 points below arts
and humanities majors and 42 points below social science majors. (NCES 1992, Table 124).
Britain is similar to the U.S. in this respect; those entering education programs have
significantly lower A level grades than average for university entrants (O'Leary 1993).
In France, by contrast, university graduates are not able to obtain a teaching post in
secondary education without first passing a rigorous subject matter examination. In 1991
only 31.3 percent of those w~o took the written exam for the Certificat d'Aptitude au
Professorat de l'Enseignement du Secondaire (CAPES) passed it. The best teaching jobs go
to those who pass an even more rigorous examination, the Agregation Exteme, which had a
pass rate of 17.7 percent in 1991.10 French and Dutch secondary school teachers tend to
be recruited from the middle (not the bottom halt) of a pool of graduates of tertiary
education which is in turn a highly selected sample of the nation's population.
The graduates of the best American universities typically do not enter secondary
school teaching because the pay and conditions of work are relatively poor.
Compensation: Data on the relative compensation of secondary school teachers is
presented in Table 5. American upper secondary teachers start at a wage that is 14 percent
below that of the average worker and after 15years of experience they earn only 33 pe~cent
more. Starting salaries are equally low in England, but in France starting salaries are 6
percent above the all worker average and in The Netherlands they are 39 percent higher.
In France. England and Scotland upper secondary school teachers with 15 years of
experience are paid 61 to 63 percent more than the average worker and in The Netherlands
they are paid 132 percent more.l1
The lower pay in the United States is not compensation for more attractive
conditions of work (see Table 5). French secondary school teachers have fewer weeks of
teaching than American teachers. They meet classes of comparable size--about 26 students
per class--but American teachers have more lessons to teach--25 per week compared to 16
to 22 per week in France. English and Scottish upper secondary teachers teach two more
weeks per year than American teachers. Their contact hours per week are similar to those
required of American upper secondary teachers, but class sizes are substantially smaller.
Only Dutch teachers have heayjer teaching loads than American teachers--c1ass sizes are
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comparable, but clock hours of instruction per week are 10 percent higher and staff are
obligated to be in school one extra week (Nelson and O'Brien 1993).
When the salaries of college graduates are compared, education majors in the U.S.
come out at the very botfom. Despite recent increases in teacher salaries the gap between
teachers and other college graduates has remained large. Data from the 1984 and 1987
Surveys of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) indicate that for 18 to 64 year olds, the
wage premium over education majors was 77 percent for physical science majors and 129
percent for economics majors. Social science majors earned 39 percent more and
humanities majors earned 8 percent more than education majors. Relative to individuals
with graduate degrees in education, those with MBAs earned 64 percent more, those with
law degrees earned 104 percent more, and those with advanced degrees in physical science
earned 75 percent more (Kominski 1990).
European nations pay their teachers better. In the United Kingdom in 1981 starting
salaries of university graduates entering teaching were 30 percent higher than for graduates
entering accounting, equal to those obtaining systems analyst jobs and only 3 percent below
starting salaries of physical scientists (Dalton and Makepeace 1990, p. 241).12 By
comparison, in the United States starting salaries of mathematics and physical science
majors who entered teaching were 42 percent below the salaries of those who obtained
computer programming and system analyst jobs and 35 percent below the starting salaries
of those obtaining a job in mathematics or physical science (NCES 1993b, p. 26).
Since Americans with university training in mathematics and science can earn much
more in non-teaching jobs, those with talent in these areas are difficult to recruit into high
school teaching. This results in most teachers being poorly prepared in science and
mathematics. This may help explain why American students lag behind French and Dutch
students in mathematics and science, but not in reading.
The low status and low salaries of American teachers are part of the reason why
achievement is low in American schools. Why does American society pay its secondary
school teachers so poorly? That is a question that will be taken up later in the paper.
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2.4 Time Devoted to Instruction
Numerous studies have found learning to be strongly related to time on task (Wiley
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1986; Walberg 1992). How do the five countries differ in the time that students spend in
classrooms and doing homework? Table 4 reports the results of a variety of studies that
compare time devoted to instruction. While estimates vary across studies, the pattern is
clear: the total amount of time spent in secondary school was significantly higher (an
average of 9 to 10 percent higher) in France, Netherlands and Scotland than in the U.S.
English students, by contrast, spent 6.7 percent less time on average in school than U.S.
secondary school students.
Does allocating additional instruction time to a subject improve performance? Yes,
it appears so. Three illustrations of the how the allocation of time to a subject influences
achievement are given below.
1. Americans and Reading: Americans get considerably more language arts instruction
in primary school than students in Europe and this probably accounts for the very
strong reading achievement of American 9 year olds. In ninth grade, however,
language arts instruction is allocated less time than in Europe and by this grade the
American advantage in reading ability has disappeared (Lundberg and Linnakyla
1992).
2. Improvements in Dutch Performance in Science: In 1971 Dutch teachers allocated
only 2 percent of time in 5th grade to science instruction and only 7 percent of time
in 9th grade to science (Passow et al, 1976) and student performance levels were
substantially below those in the U.S. and Britain. U.S. achievement levels exceeded
Dutch achievement levels by one-third of a standard deviation. (Comber and Keeves
1973, p 159). In 1982, however, Netherlands spent a remarkably high 25 percent of
9th grade instruction time on science (compared to 20 percent for the U.S. and 10
percent in England). As a result, science achievement in The Netherlands was more
than one half of a U.S. standard deviation higher than for English and American
students.
3. French Strength in Mathematics but not Science: The 1991lAEP study found that
while American and English lower secondary schools devoted equal time to
mathematics and science, French lower secondary schools spent 3.83 hours per week
teaching mathematics and 2.8 hours a week teaching science. Consistent with this
time allocation differential, mathematics was the field where French students really
excelled over American and British students, not science.
Differences in instruction time explain some achievement differentials between
countries. But they do not explain the generally poor showing of U.S. lower secondary
school students in mathematics and science. While American students spend less total time
in school, they tend to get more mathematics and science instruction time than French,
Draft LooPM 11/9/93
Not Cor Quotation
10 Dr.J
NOI
Dutch and Scottish students. Heavy European time commitments to foreign language study
tend to crowd out mathematics and science instruction. In lower secondary school, all
British students study at least one foreign language and French and Dutch students generally
study two. In America, by contrast, few lower secondary school students study a foreign
langauge and, by the end of high school, graduates have taken an average of only 1.46years
of foreign language (NCES 1992, p. 131).
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European students learn mathematics and science more thoroughly than American
students even when they spend less time on it. For example, in the IAEP study,
mathematics instruction time was the same in France and the U.S., yet French students
knew about 1.47 U.S. grade level equivalents more mathematics than American students.
In science, by contrast, instruction time was one hour per week less in France, yet
Americans still lagged about one-third of a U.S. grade level equivalent behind French
students. Why does an hour of instruction in French and Dutch classrooms produce more
learning than in American classrooms? Could heavier homework assignments be the
explanation?
Homework: Harris Cooper's (1989) meta-analysis of randomized experimental studies
found that students assigned homework scored about one-half a standard deviation higher
on post tests than students not receiving homework assignments. The impact of homework
on the rate at which middle school students learn was also significant, though somewhat
smaller. Non-experimental studies employing lEA and IAEP data come to similar
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conclusions.
French lower secondary school students do spend more time doing mathematics
homework and homework of all types. For example, 55 percent of their 13 year olds report
doing over 2 hours of homework a night, compared to 30 percent in the United States and
England and only 15 percent in Scotland. This is consistent with their lead in mathematics
achievement. In science, however, there is no evidence that Dutch and French students get
more homework than American students. Furthermore, English and Scottish students do
less homework (and have less instruction time) in mathematics and science than American
students and yet outperform them. Why does an hour of instruction and homework time
have larger learning effects in England, France and The Netherlands than in America?
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2.5 EngagementuEfTort per Unit of Scheduled Time
Classroom observation studies reveal that American students actively engage in
learning activities for only about half the time they are scheduled to be in a classroom. A
study of schools in Chicago found that public schools with high-achieving students averaged
about 75 percent of class time for actual instruction; for schools with low achieving students,
the average was 51 percent of class time (Frederick, 1977). Overall, Frederick, Walberg and
Rasher (1979) estimated 46.5 percent of the potential learning time is lost due to absence,
lateness, and inattention.
Just as important as the amount of time participating in a learning activity is the
intensity of the student's involvement in the process. At the completion of his study of
American high schools, Theodore Sizer (1984) characterized students as, "All too often
docile, compliant, and without initiative.(p. 54)" John Goodlad (1983) described: "ageneral
picture of considerablepassivity among students...(p. 113)". The high school teachers surveyed
by Goodlad ranked "lack of student interest" as the most important problem in education.
The sentiment expressed by one student, "You'regoing to workyour whole life,..{High
school should be a place to] enjoy life and have fun" (Powell et al. 1985, p 43) is quite
common. Sixty-two percent of 10th graders agree with the statement, "I don't like to do any
more school work than I have to" (Longitudinal Survey of American Youth or LSAY, Q.
AA37N).
While formal studies comparing U.S. and European ratios of on-task time to
scheduled time are not available, people who have visited classrooms in both Europe and
the U.S. report that European teachers are less likely to be talking about extraneous matters
and European students are more likely to be paying attention and doing what they have
been assigned. My visits in European and the U.S. classrooms generated similar
impressions.
Why are European teachers more likely to be on task? "'by are European students
more likely to be paying attention? Why do European teachers have higher expectations
of their students?
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III. SIGNALLING AS ULTIMATE CAUSE
External Examinations as Standard Setters J(iJ
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When questions such as these are put to French citizens and educators, they point
to the high standards and pervasive influence of the Baccalaureal. In 1992, 71 percent of
the age group took a Bac exam and 51 percent passed. Thirty-eight percent of the
Baccalaureats awarded were Bac Technologique or Bac Professionel (ie. in vocational lines)
(Ministere de L'Education Nationale 1993). This was a major accomplishment, for Bac
exams are set to a very high standard.I3 The three year lycee programs which prepare 43
percent of the age cohort for ~he exam for the Bac General are quite rigorous. Their
students are typically assigned three hours of homework per night. The Bac exams taken
in one's area of concentration are roughly comparable to the AP exams taken by American
students seeking college credit for high school work. Cornell University, for example,
generally awards advanced placement credit to recipients of the Baccalaureal General
The Bac is a passport which improves access to well paid high status jobs. It entitles
one to attend university and influences the program one is admitted. to. The payoff to
higher education is high, so access to university is highly prized. The job market also prizes
young people who have passed the Bac. There are alternative lower level examined
qualifications for employment such as the Brevetd'Er..seignmentProfessionnel (BEP) and the
CertifiCald'Aptitude Professionelle (CAP),. but the Baccalaureal confers greater access to
preferred jobs. Those without any qualifications have experienced very high unemployment
(G
see
G(
ca
Gi
en
ex
A
g,
ei
w
11
(;
tl
n
b
rates in recent years.
Dutch university graduates earn 71 percent more than secondary school graduates at
age 45 to 64 (OECD 1992, Table R7), so access to university is highly prized in the
Netherlands as well. Examinations set by the Ministry of Education influence access to
postsecondary education, so the high achievement levels of Dutch students in mathematics
and science can be explained in the same way.I4 In both France and the Netherlands
questions and answers are published in the paper and available on video text. The
published exams signal the standards that students and teachers must aim for.
Nine-tenths of English youth now take the General Certificate of Secondary
Education (GCSE) exam at the end of 11th grade and an increasing number take A levels
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Kingdom as a whole, the ratio of the number of schoolleavers passing at least one A level
(or the Scottish equivalent) to the number of 19 year olds was 23 percent in 1991
(Government Statistical Service 1993,p. 8). University graduates earn 63 percent more than
secondary school graduates at age 45 to 64 (OECD 1992, Table R7). Performance on
GCSE and A level examinations and the equivalent Scottish exams determine whether one
can attend university and which university and program you are admitted to. Grades on the
GCSE and A level exams are included on resumes and requested on job applications, so
employment opportunities depend on school results as well (Raffe 1984). These
examination systems are probably one of the reasons why British students outperform
American students at the end of secondary school.
These examples suggest that high standards examination systems serving important
gate keeping functions contribute to higher levels of academic achievement.
Increasingly, American educators and policy makers are recognizing the disincentive
effects of the American propensity to ignore or downplay previous academic achievements
when making decisions about access to postsecondary education and preferred jobs (Bishop
1990, 1993). For example, the Education Subcouncil of the Competitiveness Policy Council
(a nonpartisan group appointed by the President and congress.ionalleaders) recommended
that "external assessments be given to individual students at the secondary level and that the
results should be a major but not exclusive factor qualifying for college and better jobs at
better wages (1993, p. 30)." They justified this recommendation by noting that:
Moving to a standards driven education system in which only the adults in the
system are held accountable will not convince students that they need to take
school seriously. Working hard and achieving in school must count for them,
too. And presently, high school students who plan to go on to college do not
need to work hard and get good grades in order to achieve their goal. Except
for the tiny percentage of kind who want to go to selective colleges, students
know that, no matter how poor their grades, they will be able to find a college
that will accept them. If most colleges continue to admit students who have
done little work in high school, there is no reason to expect any change in
student behavior.
The vast majority of employers give exactly the same message to students
going directly from high school to work: What you did in high school does
not count Hard working kids do not...have an edge since few employers ever
inquire about what courses a young applicant took or ask to see a transcript
13
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(March 1993, p. 30).
External assessments of achievement that directly affect access to preferred educational and
job outcomes clearly increase student rewards for studying. The structure of rewards for
learning and, therefore, the incentive environment of students, teachers and administrators
also change in fundamental ways. I will argue that changes in the structure of rewards are
at least as important as the increase in the level of rewards for study. These issues will be
discussed under seven headings:
3.1 Peer group norms
3.2 Teacher incentives
3.3 Administrator incentives
3.4 Competition among upper secondary schools
3.5 High standards in the external exams
3.6 Redoublement, grade repeating, as Mastery Learning and an Incentive to Study
3.7 Choice of Specialization as Goal Setting
[
r
3.1 Peer Group Norms
In the United States, the peer group generally tries to discourage academic effort.
No adolescent wants to be considered a "nerd, brain geek, grade grubber or brown noser"
or to be "acting White," yet that is what happens in most classrooms to students who study
hard and are seen to study hard. Because the school's signals of achievement assess
performance relative to fellow students through grades and class rank, not relative to an
external standard, peers have a personal stake in persuading each other not to study.
A primary reason for peer pressure against studying is that pursuing academic success
forces students into a zero-sum competition with their classmates. Their situation has many
elements of the classic prisoner's dilemma game. Their achievement is not being measured
against an absolute, external standard. In contrast to scout merit badges, for example, where
recognition is given for achieving a fixed standard of competence, the school's measures of
achievement assess performance relative to fellow students through grades and class rank.
Students who study hard for exams make it more difficult for close friends (other members
of the class) to get an A or be ranked at the top of the graduating class. Since devoting
time to studying for an exam is costly, the welfare of the entire class is maximized if no one
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studies for exams which are graded on a strict curve. The cooperative solution is "no one
studies more than the minimum." Participants are generally able to tell who has broken
the "minimize studying" code and reward those who conform and punish those who do not.
Side payments and punishments are made in a currency of friendship, respect and ridicule
that is not subject to a budget constraint. For most participants the benefits that might
result from studying for the exam are less important than the very certain costs of being
considered a "brain geek", "grade grubber," ''brown noser" or "acting White," so most students
abide by the "minimize studying" norm.
The peer norms that result are: It is OK to be smart. You cannot help that. But, it is
definitely not OK to study hard.to get a good grade. This is illustrated by the following story
related by a Cornell undergraduate:
ETToneously I was lumped into the brains genus by others at [high] school just
because of the classes I was in. This really irked me; not only was I not an
athlete but I was also thought of as one of those "brain geeks". Being a brain
really did have a stigma attached to it. Sometimes during a free period I would
sit and listen to all the brains talk about how much they hated school work and
how they never studied and I had to bite my lip to keep from laughing out loud.
I knew they were lyin& and they lazew they were lying too. I think that a lot of
brains hung around together only because their fear of social isolation was greater
than their petty rivalries. I think that my two friends who were brains liked me
because I was almost on their level but I was not competitive (Tim 1986).
Note how those who broke the 'minimize studying' norm tried to hide the fact from
classmates. They did not espouse an alternative "learning is fun and important" norm.
The costs and benefits of studying vary across students because interest in the subject
varies, ability varies and parental pressure and rewards vary. This heterogeneity means that
some students break the "minimize studying" norm. When they are a small minority, they
cannot avoid feeling denigrated by classmates. In the top track and at schools where many
students aspire to attend competitive colleges, the numbers of such students are generally
sufficient to create a sub culture of its own with its own norms denigrating those who do
poorly on tests or who disrupt classroom activities. This is the structural basis of the "brains"
and "preppie" cliques found in most American high schools. Most high school students,
however, are in cliques that denigrate studying.
Peer pressure not to study does not derive from laziness. In jobs after school and at
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football practice, American adolescents work very hard. In these environments they are part
of a team where individual efforts are visible and appreciated by teammates. Competition
and rivalry are not absent, but they are offset by shared goals, shared successes and external
measures of achievement (Le. satisfied customers or winning the game). On the sports field,
there is no greater sin than giving up, even when the score is hopelessly one sided. On the
job, tasks not done by one worker will generally have to be completed by another. For too
many students in too many high schools, when it comes to academics, there is no greater sin
than trying hard.
Peer pressure was one of.the topics in my interviews of school staff and students in
England, The Netherlands and France. The French educators I interviewed reported that
peer pressure not to study occurred sometimes, but only in some of the classes in the lower
secondary schools, not at the lycee serving upper middle class students that I visited. It
appeared to be mild by American standards. In upper secondary schools particularly in the
math-science line, the peer pressure was in fact to excel. Discussions with English and
Dutch students and educators produced similar observations.
3.2 Teacher Incentives
Most American secondary school teachers do not feel individually accountable for
the learning of their students. Unionization is not responsible for this phenomena, for
unionized European and Japanese secondary school teachers feel accountable for the
learning of their students. The lack of accountability for learning stems from: (1) the rarity
of examinations assessing student achievement in particular subjects relative to an external
standard, and (2) the fact that most secondary school students receive instruction in a given
subject from many different teachers. Only coaches, band conductors and teachers of
advanced placement classes are exceptions to this norm. They teach in environments where
student achievement is visible to parents and colleagues and as a result feel accountable for
outcomes.
In France and the Netherlands, by contrast, students who are preparing to take a
particular exam at the end of their secondary education typically remain together in one
class and are taught by the same teacher in successive years. Teacher continuity is also the
norm in primary school. The French 4th grade classes tested in the lEA study of reading
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achievement had the same teacher for an average of 2.4 years (see the bottom row of Table
6). The Dutch 3rd grade classes had had the same teacher for 1.7 years. The American
classes had had the same teacher for four-fifths of a year.
Since important rewards accrue to those who pass or do well on these exams,
everyone takes them very seriously. The number of students taking and passing each exam
are public knowledge within the school and among parents. Teachers' reputations are
significantly affected by exam results. Responding to such informal pressures, upper
secondary school teachers strive to prepare their students for the external exam.
American teathers are also expected to insure that most of their students pass. but
they are free to accomplish this goal, if they choose, by lowering the passing standard.
Teachers who set expectations too high get in trouble. For example, Adele Jones,
an AJgebra II teacher in Georgetown Deleware, was fired because she failed too many of
ber students (42 percent one year and 27 percent the next). When students started picketing
the school carrying "hastily scrawled signs with such slogans as 'I Failed Ms Jones' class and
It Was My Fault' and 'Just Because a Student is Failing Doesn't Mean the Teocher Is' (Bradley
1993, p. 19)," the national, news media took notice. According to Ann Bradley, the
Education Week reporter covering the story:
Ms. Jones had the reputation for being a tough, dedicate.d teocher who expected
a lot of her students. In return she gave a lot of herself, arriving at school at 7:15
every morning and staying until 6 at night to tutor students who were having
trouble in her class (Sept 19, 1993 p. 1).
Tbe principal of the school justified his decision witb the following:
''/ have made it very clear that one of my goals is to decrease the failure rate, to
make sure the kids feel good about leamin& stay in class, stay in school and do
welL... Math is just a big body of knowledge; what is Algebra II ocross the nation
anyway?" he asks. When he taught band, be adds, be certainly didn't expect
kids to finish tbe year as musiciansnbut he did want them to know more
about music than they did before..uAII the talk about preparing students for
college struck him as '7udicrous." Instead the goal should be to keep students
studying math (Sept 19, 1993 p. 19, 20).
Ann Mueller, the chair of the math department, said:
The impression I got from t!le hearing...is that the kids are [viewed by the
administration as] boxes and its our responsibility as teacher to see how much
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we can stuff into that box, with no responsibility by the kids (p. 20).
The students interviewed by the reporter agreed with Ann Mueller. Senior Norman
Kennedy said, the students who flunked Ms Jones class, 'were sleeping. They don't want to
learn. They goof off, and they talk." Jodie Edwards, another senior, said:
All the principal talks about is making us feel good,...but I feel better when I
know I actually did it than when I'm just given an A I've been in classes where
I just sit there and pass with no problem. But [Ms Jones is] the best math
teacher I ever had. I actually learned something in her class, and I can
remember it (p. 20).
At the hearing Walter Hall Jr.,. a student who had flunked the course, testified:
'1 guess some of it could be attributed to a lack of study, becCIU$eI wasn't really
like into the books hour after hour, But in the rest of my classes, I was doing
fairly wel~ and it was only testing that gave me a problem." He added that his
parents had wondered how he could be getting such good grades in most
classes without studying (p. 20).
Ms. Jones had been on individual improvement plans for two years designed to bring her
student-failure rate into line with the rest of the school's. She had made numerous changes
in how she taught and grades had increased somewhat, '1 thought I had done whal they
wanted me to." However, "unlike some teachers at the school, she refused on principle, to
grade her students on a curve. She believed that students should be graded on what they
had learned, not on what they learned in comparison to what others had learned--or not
learned (Bradley 1993, p. 20)."
Ms Jones is unusual; most teachers realize that there is a limit to how many students
they can fail and structure their grading to stay within the limit. More commonly, the
struggle over expectations plays out in the privacy of the classroom. Sizer's description of
Ms. Shiffe's biology class, illustrates what sometimes happens:
She wanted the students to know these names. They did not want to know them
and were not going to learn them. Apparently no outside threaluflunking, for
exampleuaffected the students. Shiffe did her thing, the students chaltered on,
even in the presence of a visitor Their common front of uninterest probably
made e.mminations moot. Shiffe could not flunk them al~ and, if their
performance was uniformly shoddy, she would have to pass them alL Her
desperation was as obvious as the students' cruelty toward her. (1984 p. 157-158)
Theodore Sizer's (1984) description of Mr. Brody's class provides an example of how
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teachers benefit from setting modest goals.
He signaled to the students what the minima, the few question\' for a test, were;
all tenth and eleventh-graders could master these with absurdly little difficulty.
The youngsters picked up the signal and kept their part of the bargain by being
friendly and orderly. They did not push Brody, and he did not push
them Brody's room was quiet, and his students liked him, No wonder he had
the esteem of the principal who valued orderliness and good rapport between
students and staff. Brody and his class had agreement, all n'ght, agreement that
reduced the efforts of both students and teacher to an irreducible and pathetic
minimum. (p. 156)
Some exceptional teachers are able, through the force of their own personalities, to
overcome the obstacles and induce their students to undertake tough learning tasks. But
for most, the students' lassitude is demoralizing. All too often teachers compromise
academic demands because the bulk of the class sees no need to accept them as reasonable
and legitimate.
3.3 Administrator Incentives
The local political accountability of American schools more often than not leads to
lower, not higher standards. A.B. Hollingshead documented cases of political interference
in grading and school awards in his ethnography of a small Indiana town and its schools in
1941-42.15 Two of the members of the school board that decided to fire Adele Jones were
parents of students who "had not done well in her class (Bradley p. 21)." European
countries opted for university selection systems based largely on external exams in part to
avoid charges of favoritism.
External assessment changes the incentives facing school administrators. In the U .S,
locally elected school boards and the administrators they hire (not state departments of
education) make the thousands of decisions which determine academic expectations and
program quality (eg. homework guidelines, whether to retain a popular but not very effective
teacher, whether to raise wages so as to attract better teachers, etc.). When there is no
external assessment of academic achievement, students at a school and their parents benefit
little from administrative decisions which opt for higher standards, more qualified teachers
or a heavier student work load. The immediate consequences of such decisions--higher
taxes, more homework, having to repeat courses, lower GP A's, less time for fun courses, a
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greater risk of being denied a diploma--are all negative.
When student learning is not assessed externally, the positive effects of choosing
academic rigor are negligible and postponed. Since college admission decisions are based
on rank in class, GP A and aptitude tests, not externally assessed achievement in high school
courses, upgraded standards will not improve the college admission prospects of the school's
graduates. Graduates will perform better in difficult college courses and will be more likely
to get a B.A., but that benefit is uncertain and far in the future. Maybe over time the local
reputation of the high school, and with it the admission prospects of future graduates, will
improve because the current crop of graduates are more successful in local colleges, but that
is even more uncertain and postponed.16
Few American employers pay attention to a student's achievement in high school or
the school's reputation when they make hiring selections (Bishop 1990, 1993, Hollenbeck
and Smith 1984). Those that do pay attention to achievement use indicators of relative
performance such as GP A and rank in class rather than results on an external exam as a
hiring criterion. Consequently, higher standards do not benefit students as a group, so
parents as a group have little incentive to lobby strongly for higher teacher salaries, higher
standards and higher school taxes. Employers who recruit from a local high school are often
the only group with a real interest in general increases in achievement. Since, however, they
pay a disproportionate share of school taxes, they tend to support only the policy options
that do not cost additional money.
In Europe, by contrast, the record of each sc~ool on the external examinations (the
numbers passing or getting high grades) are published in local and national newspapers. In
England and Scotland, the results for each examined subject are printed in the school's
annual report which is sent to parents of current and prospective students. Exhibit 1, 2 and
3 offer examples of such reports. Exhibit 3 from Haverstock School located in the Borough
of Camden near downtown London even provides an indicator of value added--separate data
on examination success rates by student ability (assessed at the end of primary school).
The school's reputation in the community is influenced by the publication of school
league tables summarizing these detailed results. Exhibit 4 provides an example of the type
of information that is published for every grant maintained school in England.
Administrators seeking to strengthen their school's reputation are thus induced to give
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The Bandin~ System is used in conjunction with parental choice in the allocation of pupils to secondo)' scllouls.
On the basis of primary school judgement and the perforffionces in a ~eneral test of verbal rcasonin~1 PUllils are
divldl:d into three broad groupsing!>. Band I represents those 25% who atar,e 10 appeared abovC' average; Band 2, the
:JO',',who appeared average and Gand 2, the 25':~who at that age appeal'ed below average.
Thl' PI'loforomance Score was developed to provide a sensitivC' measure of pupils' performance in all subjects taken in
the. CCSE examinations. Points are assigned for different grades ranp;ing from 7 points for an A gr'adc to I poinL for
a ~cr:\cll~ G. !I]though the points for each grade Wf'r'cassic;ned on an arbitrary scal,~, there is evidence that altering tile
~;call' mak('s very little difference. Thl~ m:1in use of the scale is that it provides an opportunity to make comparisuns
1)(-1\\'('('n similar !~roups of pupils over different years.
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teaching effectiveness (as assessed by the external exam) first priority. \
3.4 Competition among Upper Secondary Schools
French, Dutch, English and Scottish upper secondary schools face a competitive
environment that is similar in many ways to the one faced by American colleges and
universities. Funding is on a per student basis, so schools experiencing an increase in
applications have an incentive to expand up to the maximum their physical plant can
accommodate. Schools with strong reputations get many more applications than they can
accept and are, in effect, rewarded by being allowed to select what they consider to be the
"best" from their pool of applicants.
Access to the top upper secondary schools depen~s primarily on a student's
achievement in lower secondary schools, not on her parent's ability to buy a house in a
suburb with an excellent high school as in the U.S. This means that parents who want their
child to attend the best upper secondary schools must make sure their child studies hard in
lower secondary school.
In France, England and Scotland the great majority of upper secondary schools,
however, admit students on a first come first serve basis (sometimes giving priority to
students living near the school), so a poor academic record in previous grades does not
prevent students from entering upper secondary school or having a choice of school.
The Netherlands has three types of general secondary school--the VWO, the HA VO
and the MA VO--and a system of lower vocational schools, LBO /LEAOs abd KVBOs, which
prepare students for occupationally specific exams as well as general education exams. The
first year curriculum is supposed to be the same in all schools so that students can transfer
between schools at its conclusion. In succeeding years, however, curricula and rigor diverge:
Rigor and work loads are greatest at the 6 year VWO's, somewhat less demanding at the
5 year HA VOs and still less demanding in the 4 year MA VOs. Which and how many
foreign languages are studied also differ across school types. The LBOs devote considerable
time to occupationally specific curricula, so less time is available for general studies. Advise
to parents about which type of school is appropriate for their child is based on the pupil's
record in primary school. Parents have the right, however, to select the type of school and
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which school of that type their child will enter. There are three parallel systems of
education--a 10cal1yadministered public system, a Catholic system and a Protestant system--
so parents have many schools to choose from.
Essential to a competitive environment, of course, is the right of families to send
their child to the upper secondary school of thdr choice if the child qualifies academically.
Political boundaries do not constrain choice of upper secondary school. Barriers to
attending a school other than the closest one are low in these countries because schools are
smaller and consequently more numerous, population densities are higher, public
transportation is often available, opportunities to participate in sports and music are often
organized by the community not the school, and centralized funding of schools means that
spending per pupil varies little and money follows the student even when a school in a
nearby community is selected. In 1984, two years after choice became operational in
Scotland, 9 percent of pupils entering secondary school nationally (11 to 14 percent in urban
areas) attended a school outside their cachement area (Adler and Raab 1988). Scottish
parents who make this choice appear to be behaving rationally for they tend to choose
schools which are more effective than the school in their own cachement area. An analysis
of school choice in the Fife Education Authority found that the schools chosen by those
leaving their cachement area had better examination results at age 16 than would have been
predicted given the pupil's initial test scores and social background characteristics and the
average SES of pupils at the schoolY Consequently, the free choice of schools that
prevails in our four European nations generates a competitive pressure on schools to excel
that doesn't have any counterpart in the U.S. outside the cities with magnet schools.
3.5 Standards of the External Exam
External examinations at the end of secondary school are probably necessary if high
achievement levels are to be attained, but they are not sufficient. Examinations that are not
challenging, that are taken by only a small minority of the age group, or that do not
generate substantial rewards for successful examinees will have little effect on average
achievement levels.
British youth have significantly lower achievement levels than French and Dutch
youth. The gap is not as large as for American youth, but it is substantial, particularly at
Draft 1:00PM 11/9/93
Not for Quotation
23 On
Not
age 13 and 14 when the entire age group is in school. One possible explanation for this is
that the passing standard of the GCSE is lower than for the Bac and the Dutch exams, and
the more difficult A levels are taken by only a small minority (17 percent of school Ieavers
in 1981 and 23 percent of schoolleavers in 1991, Government Statistical Service 1993, p. 8).
Further evidence that the passing standard of the external exam is important comes
from examining the American states that have instituted minimum competency exams for
high school graduation. While these exams have apparently reduced the numbers of
students with very low basic skills levels (Lerner 1991), the achievement levels required to
pass were set quite low (about an eighth grade level of competence), and they have clearly
not brought American achievement levels up to European standards.
New York State's Regents Exams are more difficult and they are probably a major
reason why, when the family income, parental education, race and gender of SAT test takers
were controlled, New York State had the highest adjusted mean SAT test score of the
sample of 38 states with reasonably large numbers of test takers (Graham and Husted,
1993). The Regents exams are, however, considerably easier than the Bac and the rewards
for doing well on them are quite modest. Indeed, Regents exam results determine only
whether you get a particular type of high school diploma. Schools and teachers are not
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required to incorporate Regents exam grades into the student's course grades. In many
schools the Regents Exam grade accounts for only one-quarter of the student's final grade
in the course. A passing score is not necessary for admission to community colleges in the
state and employers ignore exams results when they make hiring decisions. Regents
scholarships have been awarded on the basis of aptitude test scores, the SAT, not Regents
exam results. The low passing standard and the weak rewards for doing well on Regents
exams help to explain why New York students do not achieve at French or Dutch levels.
High passing standards on external exams are clearly associated with high
achievement levels. Does this reflect a cause and effect relationship? Yes, but causation
runs in both directions. High passing standards on a high stakes exam are politically
sustainable only when most students taking the exam are able to meet the standard.
Howson's examination of the mathematics curricula of thirteen nations led him to conclude
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that "anyone studying the curricula reprinted in this book will note just how low are English
expectations for the below average pupil in certain areas, particularly arithmetic, which other as
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nations regard as basic. (1991, p. 37)" The median pupil in Britain, for example, is not
expected to learn the times tables up to 10 X 10 until age 11. If the GCSE mathematics
exams were made more demanding without strengthening mathematics teaching, failure
rates might rise to politically unacceptable levels.
Does the passing standard also influence student effort? When I asked my Cornell
students to reflect on this question, the following response was typical: "As I look back on
my high school education, I now realize that I learned (and retained) the most from the teachers
who were the toughest and most demanding. (Kurt 1989, p. 6)" Quantitative research
confirms such reflections. In High School and Beyond data, those taking more rigorous
courses learn a good deal more between sophomore and senior year, even though their
grade point average suffers as a result (Bishop 1985, Gamoran and Barends 1987).
There have been over a hundred experimental studies of the effect of goal difficulty
on various kinds of achievement and "meta analyses have demonstrated that difficult goals
lead to higher performance than easy goals" (Wright, George, Farnsworth & McMahan 1993
p. 374). Mento, Steel & Karren's review of the literature concluded that "If there is ever
to be a viable candidate from the organizational sciences for elevation to the lofty status of
scientific law of nature, then the relationship between goal difficulty, difficulty jspecificity
and task performance are most worthy of serious consideration (1987, p. 74)." The effects
are quite large: on highly complex tasks like school and college course work, specific hard
goals raised achievement by 47 percent of a standard deviation (Wood, Mento and Locke
1987).
In the laboratory and field settings used by psychologists conducting this research, the
subjects have generally accepted the goal set for them by the researcher. Achievement goes
up, but the probability of failing to reach the goal rises as well. In most studies more than
two-thirds of those in the "hard goal" condition failed to achieve their goal (Locke 1968 p.
163-165). Most of the studies examine behavior over relatively short periods of time. One
would imagine, however, that if such experiments lasted a couple of years, those who
consistently failed to achieve their goal would be likely to either lower their goals or give
up on the enterprise altogether (ie. drop out physically or psychologically).
Stedry (1960) found that when subjects who had already set their own goals were
assigned even higher goals by the study director, they rejected the assigned goal and
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achievement did not rise. This appears to be what happens in American secondary schools.
Most students reject the goals teachers set because the rewards for success are small.
Others reject them because they appear unattainable.
How do European education systems induce students in upper secondary schools to
set difficult learning goals and work towards them? They do not, as some have proposed
for the U.S., set a single high yea-nay standard that everyone is expected to meet. Young
people are much too different from each other for such a policy to work. Students have
specialized interests and talents and need to be able to emphasize subjects which allow them
to develop their special talents. Ability, motivation, interest in the subject and background
knowledge vary greatly, so performance varies greatly. On the criterion referenced NAEP
mathematics scale, 15 percent of American 13 year aIds have better mathematics skills than
the average 17 year old student, and 7 percent of 13 year aIds score below the average 9
year old (NAEP 1988b). On the criterion referenced NAEP reading scale, 16.5 percent of
13 year aIds have better reading skills than the average 17 year old student, and 9 percent
of 13 year aIds score below the average 9 year old (NAEP 1986). The variance of
achievement at age 13 is roughly comparable abroad (IAEP 1992). Even if the variance of
achievement were cut in half, 15 percent of 13 year aIds would still perform better than the
average 16 year old and 7 percent would perform below the average 10 year old.
If a single passing standard applies to everyone, many students will pass the standard
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without exertion and will, therefore, not be stimulated to improve by the need to pass the
exam.18 Many other students will calculate that they are now so far behind and the effort
required to achieve the standard is so great, the costs of the effort are larger than the
possible reward. They will reject the goal of meeting the standard. When the variance of
performance is large, only a small portion of students will find the reward attached to a
single absolute passing standard an incentive to study (Kang 1985). Increasing the reward
for passing the single standard does not solve the problem because this inevitably leads to
political pressure to lower the achievement level necessary to pass. Shifting responsibility
for setting the passing standard from the teacher to a statewide Department of Education
does not make the decision any less controversial.
Thus, a single yea-nay passing standard which everyone is expected to achieve is not
an attractive policy and no country has adopted it.19 External exams need to signal the
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level of a student's achievement, not just whether the exam was passed. Dutch external
exams are graded on a 1 to 10 scale. Excellence on the Baccalaureat exams results in the
award of a Tres Bien, a Bien or an Assez Bien. Once information on performance levels
becomes available, employers and institutions of higher education will tend to base their
selection decisions on it. Graduates with the strongest exam results have options not
available to those with weak results, and the outcome is a system of graduated rewards. In
When the variance of achievement is high, incentives for effort are stronger on average
under a graduated rewards system than under a single large reward attached to achieving
a fixed standard (Kang 1985).
Ninety percent of English and 97 percent of Scottish secondary students attend public
comprehensive secondary schools which deliver a common National Curriculum to all
students. The English GCSE and Scottish "Lowers" Examinations taken by 90 percent of
16 year olds conform to Kang's model. There are substantial and graduated rewards for
doing well on these exams. Indeed the rewards for doing particularly well on these external
exams, while smaller than those in France, appear larger than those in the Netherlands.2°
Why then are English and Scottish 13 year olds assigned less homework than their
American and Dutch counterparts? (see Table 6 and Robitaille and Garden ]989,
Postlethwaite and Wiley 1992, lAEP 1992) Why is their achievement in mathematics and
science at age 13 significantly lower than in the Netherlands? As the time for the exam
approaches in Britain, teacher demands and student effort increase substantially. At age 13,
however, standards are low. Why do the backwash effects of the exams at the end of
secondary school extend further back in the pupil's schooling in the Netherlands and
France than in Britain?
3.6 Redoublement as Mastery Learning and an Incentive to Study
British standards are low for 10 through 13 year olds because there are few
immediate consequences for doing well or poorly at this age. The external exams are three
to six years away. Students are promoted to the next grade regardless of how well they do
in the previous grade. Those who fall behind inevitably slow the pace of the class in
succeeding years.
Selective secondary schools account for only 10 percent of pupils in England and 3
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percent in Scotland, so only a small minority of 10 to 12 year olds are under parental
pressure to study harder in order to gain admission to a selective secondary school.
Teachers at public primary schools perceive themselves to be preparing children for entry
into the local comprehensive secondary school; not for entry into selective tuition charging
grammar schools.
Primary school teachers quite reasonably do not feel accountable for how well
students do on exams taken after four years of attendance at a secondary school. Secondary
schools tend to be large and the teachers who handle the first year students also lack a sense
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of accountability for performance on exams that are more than three years in the future.
The government has attempted to enhance accountability in England by introducing
compulsory external examinations assessing mastery of the national curriculum at the end
of primary education and two years into secondary school and publishing the results school
by school. These exams are intended to inform parents about their child's progress and to
help them assess the effectiveness of local schools. The exams are not to be used for
selection. Teachers objected to these exams, however, and successfully boycotted their
administration during the 1992-93 school year. In Scotland, student progress on national
curriculum goals for 11 and 14 year olds are informally assessed by the student's teacher,
not by an external exam.
The situation is very different in France and the Netherlands. Pupils who fail more
than one of their required secondary school courses are generally required to redoubler. The
American translation of redoubler is "to be held back" or "to repeat the grade.,,2l The
French word redoubler has a more active connotation, similar to the English word, "to
redouble." In France, decisions about redoublement (repeating a grade) are made by the
Conseil de Class, made up of the teachers for that class and two parent representatives. The
teachers' "basic motivation is to help the child himself, to ensure that the pupil is sufficiently
well prepared so that he may fully benefit from work at a more demanding level."zz To
them redoublement is a form of Mastery Learning, a way of allowing some students extra
time to achieve very demanding learning goals.
By British and American standards, redoublement rates are extremely high in France
and the Netherlands. In 1990 Dutch redoublement rates were 7.5 percent per year in
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academic lower secondary schools, 5.1 percent per year in LBOs, the vocational lower
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secondary schools, and 13.3 percent per year in academic upper secondary schools. French
rates of redoublement ranged from 6.8 and 11.0 percent per year during the four years of
general lower secondary education, ranged from 12.1 to 18.4 percent per year in the three
year academic upper secondary schools and averaged 8.4 percent per year in the first two
years of vocational upper secondary schools (see Appendix A).23
Redoublement is not something that is inflicted only on children from lower class
backgrounds. Often high aspirations can be achieved only by redoublement. The two Dutch
professors with grown children with whom I have discussed this matter both had a child who
was required to redoubler. In France selective upper secondary sch'ools serving upper middle
class communities have grade repeating rates that are nearly as high as schools serving lower
income communities. For example, Lycee Charlemagne, an upper secondary school serving
one of the richest neighborhoods in Paris, asked 14 percent of its entering class to repeat
the year in 1992. As a result, over half of French students in the final year of an academic
track high school have repeated at least one year of school. Since those who redouble tend
to shift to vocational lines of study, even higher proportions of the students in vocational
programs are over the theoretical age. In the second year of HEP and CAP programs (the
11th year of schooling if there has been no redoublement), 93% of students are over the
theoretical age and 58% are more than one year over age.24 This phenomenon is one of
the reasons why France and The Netherlands have school enrollment rates for 17 and 18
year olds which are comparable to U.S. levels even though rates of entry into post-secondary
education are lower.
For secondary school students, the threat of having to redoubler is a strong incentive
to study. When I asked how the students who must redouble feel about it, I was told that
they feel "dishonored." Since redoublement is a public event, parents also feel stigmatized,
so they have an incentive to see that their child studies hard.
In The Netherlands, students who are having difficulty keeping up with the
demanding pace of a YWO or HA YO curricula often have a choice: either repeat the year
or transfer to a less demanding type of school. At the VWO I visited in The Netherlands,
one third of the entering class transfers to a HA YO or a less demanding VWO before the
beginning of the third year. YWOs offer a fast paced 6 year university preparation program.
Parents who want their child to enter a YWO are generally accommodated even when
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primary school teachers advise against it. The child's performance in school determines
whether the parents' aspirations are realized or whether a transfer to a less demanding type
of school is necessary.
Being forced to transfer to a HA VO or a MA VO does not foreclose university
attendance. With good grades at the end of the 5 year HA VO program the student can
transfer to a VWO, complete the final two years and then enter university. In addition,
numerous vocationally oriented higher education options are open to HA VO and MA VO
graduates and transfers to university are feasible with good grades. It is even possible to
make it into university after starting out in an LBO, the lower vocational school. There is
a Dutch student in Cornell University's animal science PhD program who did just that.
These alternative routes to university are open; they just take longer.
While other routes to university are possible, pupils who choose the fast track in 7th
grade, a VWO, do not want to be forced "to get off the train." Students in The Netherlands
and France are formed into classes which take most subjects together and which remain
intact for two years and sometimes longer. This class is one's peer group, the group with
whom you spend most of your time. When I asked a Dutch student who, despite long hours
of study, had been required to repeat a grade, why she had studied so hard, she responded
"! wanted to stay with my class!" Students do not want to have to repeat the grade because
it threatens to sever the friendships they have made in the class. Apparently, trying to keep
up academically (ie. accepting the academic goals of the school) is viewed positively by
peers because it is an expression of commitment to the group. Those who refuse to study
are apparently seen as rejecting the group. In these two countries peer pressure seems to
encourage lagging students to study, not discourage them as in the U.S.
3.7 Choice of Specialization as Goal Setting
All education systems give upper secondary students (and their parents) the right to
select a specialty and the right to choose the rigor and difficulty level of either the school,
the academic program or specific courses.
In France there are two types of upper secondary school: Lycee generale and
technologique (which offer a variety of three year programs in academic and technological
specialties leading to a Bac exam) and the Lycee d'Enseignement Professionnel (vocational
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schools which offer two year programs preparing students for the Brevet d'Enseignmellt
Professionnel (BEP) and the Certificat d'Aptitude Professionelle (CAP) and two year follow
on programs leading to the Baccalaureat Professionnel. Each type of school offers a variety
of specializations each of which leads to a different package of Bac exams. In the Lycee
generale, specialization now occurs in the second year. Most lycees offer four or more
different lines of study. Students take almost all their subjects with other members of a
class (mean size 31 pupils) that is formed once specialization commences. The class stays
together for the final two years of lycee.
Four lines--literatureand languages (A), economICS and social science (B),
mathematics and physical sciences (C), and biology (D)--have roughly equal numbers of
students and together account for most of the Baccalaureat Generales awarded. The
Mathematics-Physics-Chemistry line (C) is the most difficult, carries the greatest prestige
and keeps open the option of going to a preparatory school for one of the Grandes Ecoles
(elite post-secondary colleges comparable in prestige to Harvard). Admission to the Cline
within a lycee is generally highly competitive. Many Lycees also offer programs in a variety
of business and vocational subjects which lead to the Technical Bac (BTn). The
Netherlands has a similar though less elaborated system of specialization within general
upper secondary education. As in France the math-science line has the reputation of being
the most difficult.
Lines are more than a response to different interests and types of talent among
students. They are also one of the ways European school systems deal with the fact that
some 15 year olds are willing and able to tackle more difficult material than others, while
simultaneously trying to minimize the invidious distinctions between those who choose more
or less difficult programs of study.25 The lines have a tracking effect, but since they are
based on the student's choice of field (rather than a smart/dumb or high/low distinction),
equal formal respect and status is given to accomplishments in the different lines. The fact
that classes are formed around subjects of study rather than student ability also helps
maintain the morale of the teachers of the less able students. Teachers of social studies (or
a vocational subject) may complain about their inability to attract the best students into
their major, but their belief in and love of their subject induces them set high standards and
to do the best they can with the students who specialize in their field.
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In France and the Netherlands, picking one's school and specialization effectively sets
a specific learning goal. The large numbers of students who are forced to repeat grades or
switch to easier schools and programs implies that most students and parents are setting very
difficult goals. The goal setting literature tells us that working towards a specific and
difficult goal generates much stronger motivation than being told to "do your best" or setting
easy goals. Thus the continental European pattern of setting highly ambitious goals,
maximizes average achievement levels even while it increases the number of students who
II
it
fail to achieve the goal they set. Why do French and Dutch parents select secondary
schools and programs that are so challenging that many must repeat grades to keep up or
transfer into easier programs and schools? There are three reasons. First, the goal
selected is visible to parents, relatives and neighbors and going for difficult goals confers
prestige just as volunteering for the Marines or the Rangers confers prestige. Second,
achieving difficult learning goals is rewarded by admission to preferred universities and
fields of study and access to better jobs. Finally, the choice is generally made by the parent,
not the child. Parents are better informed about the long term benefits of achieving difficult
goals and their own prestige rises when their child attends a selective school or pursues a
difficult line of study. Parents may view the extra studying necessary in a rigorous specialty
as a plus rather than a negative as the child is likely to.
In America, by contrast, selecting difficult goals generates much weaker rewards.
Everyone in the neighborhood attends the same school. Students select individual courses,
not programs or schools. Subjects are taught at vastly different levels, but the rigor of these
courses is not well signalled to parents, relatives, neighbors, employers and colleges.
Admissions staff at selective colleges learn how to read the transcripts of high schools they
recruit heavily from and they evaluate grades in that light,26 However, most colleges have,
historically, not factored the rigor of high school courses into their admissions decisions.27
Almost no employers do so. The students who do not aspire to attend a selective college,
consequently, quite rationally avoid rigorous courses and demanding teachers.
Most parents are uninformed about course options and their consequences and fail
to influence the choices made. In the university town of Ithaca, New York, for example, less
than one-fifth of parents attend the meeting in 8th grade at which the student and guidance
counselor plan the student's 9th through 12th grade course sequence. Many students
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manipulate the information their parents receive, so as to minimize the academic demands
that are placed on them. This is illustrated by the following story:
In my case I stalled many attempts of my parents to get involved in my
education. I wanted to be left alone in high school, and the high school was
more than willing to accommodate my wish. Any parental influence could have
damaged the treaty, and, therefore, I was cognizant that I needed to keep my
parents out of my high school relationship. My parent s lack of infonnation
about the high school was my biggest ally in accomplishing my objective. They
knew that I took math, science, and English, but in a modem high school those
titles are meaningless as you could sleep through most classes and still receive
above average grades. The other factor in my advantage was that my parents did
not know the level of my scholastic ability. It was difficult, if not impossible for
them to know if my average to above average grades were good or bad since
grades are a very relative measure of perfonnance. For some students an average
grade is great, while for others it is poor.
My high school offered a variety of classes to deal with the diversity of its
population. If asked, its administrators and faculty would claim that it has
devised the perfect curriculum to meet the vast demands of the community. 1f
that is true, how do you explain my situation. At fourteen years of age my high
school gave me the freedom to choose my destiny. At that time I chose to
mentally opt out of school. My decision not only went unchallenged, it was
furthered with the help of the system and teachers that allowed free choice at the
expense of my education. The system created social nonns that encouraged my
apathy and under achievement. I was so entrenched in the culture of the
unspecial that I made conscious efforts to keep my parents from interfering with
my decisions. It was not hard to do as the system was set up to give the illusion
that everyone was receiving an equal and credible education (Jeff 1991, 7-8).
Some students, the small minority who want to attend highly selective colleges, sign up for
demanding courses. Most students choose courses that have the reputation of being fun and
not requiring much work to get a good grade. Teachers know this and adjust their style of
teaching, their homework assignments and their grading standards with an eye to
maintaining enrollment levels.
Guidance counselors are not encouraged to push extra students into the moore
demanding classes. Parents who want their child in the more demanding course are
accommodated, but, behind their back, they are referred to as "pushy" or "elitest." For the
great majority of students with non-pushy parents, most counselors see their role as insuring
that the pupil does not get in over his head. No one should risk failure. In Ithaca, for
example, those wanting to take Regents Earth Science in 8th rather than in 9th grade (so
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as to make room for additional science courses in high school) are not supposed to be
allowed into the course unless a B + is pretty much assured.
In many cases the parents of children assigned to less demanding courses are not
informed that there is a more demanding course that their child might have taken. In
Ithaca, for example, 6th graders learn which of four types of mathematics classes they have
been assigllf.~dto on the first day of middle school. If parents were to look at the schedule
their child brings home they might see the word "enriched" and conclude that their child is
taking the most demanding course. In fact, their child is in a class that moves at a slower
pace tha.n the "accelerated" class. If calculus is to be taken in senior year, a switch into the
accelerated stream is essential, but it becomes increasingly difficult as time passes. Only a
few parents are aware of the long term consequences of the 6th grade math class assignment
and the middle school makes no effort to inform parents of these consequences early
enough to arrange a transfer into "accelerated" before the accelerated students have covered
a good deal of ground not covered in the "enriched" class.
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IV. Summary and Policy Implications
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At the beginning of the 1980s French and Dutch 13 and 14 year olds were about 1.5
to 2 grade level equivalents ahead of American students in mathematics and science. British
students had higher achievement than American students but lower achievement than
French and Dutch students. These differentials were not caused by low school attendance
rates. in Europe or higher spending in Europe. They were not caused by allocating more
time to the study of these subjects. Indeed heavy European investments in foreign language
instruction result in their lower secondary students receiving less instruction in math and
science than American students. The high achievement in France and The Netherlands
comes from better teaching, greater time on task and greater student engagement in
leaJrning. Secondary school teaching is a much better paid and prestigious occupation in
France and The Netherlands than in the United States and, so consequently, better prepared
university graduates are recruited into the profession.
Why are European students more engaged in learning? Why are European teachers
better paid and more respected? In The Netherlands and France, learning in secondary
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school is assessed by difficult subject specific external examinations and doing well on these
exams generates very large rewards for the student. The reputations of teachers and schools
are also affected by student achievement on these exams. Parents base their selection of
the upper secondary school their child will attend and which academic or vocational
program she will pursue, in part, on these reputations. Parents tend to set difficult goals for
their children, so most students are placed in programs of study which for them are very
demanding. Students are formed into classes which take all their subjects together, remain
intact for two years or more and become the student's peer group and reference group.
Students who are not progressing at the rate necessary to succeed on the external exam are
asked either to switch to an easier curriculum or to repeat the year. Students do not want
to be forced to sever the friendships they have developed in the class, so they are strongly
motivated to keep up with their studies.
In the United States, students are being ranked relative to their classmates, not
assessed against an external criterion, so they pressure each other not to study. Teachers
are expected to pass almost all students, and if the class fails to study hard, the teacher is
forced to lower the passing standard of the course. Subjects are taught at vastly different
levels, but the rigor of the course and the learning achievements that result are not well
signalled to parents, neighbors, colleges and employers, so rewards for setting difficult goals
are small. In addition, the choice of which course to take is generally not made by the
parent, but by the 13 to ]6 year old child and her guidance counselor (someone who is
motivated more by the desire to minimize the risk of failure than the desire to stretch and
challenge the child).
Clearly, everyone--students, parents, teachers, and administrators--faces much stronger
incentives to strive for academic excellence in France and the Netherlands than in the
United States. Significantly greater achievement in mathematics, science and foreign
languages is the result. Incentives for excellence in Britain lie somewhere between the
French and the American pole, and so does performance.
The French and the Dutch models of secondary education combine in one system
many of the most drastic reforms that have been proposed for the United States:
* externally set subject specific achievement exams which are taken by almost all high
school graduates,
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* every school a magnet school--parental choice of upper secondary school and special
field of study with money following students,
* mastery learning with teeth (those who fail two subjects in secondary school are
required to either repeat the grade or transfer to a less demanding school or
program),
* 30 percent higher teacher salaries and high standards subject competency exams
regulating entry into secondary school teaching,
* High standards for admission to post secondary education.
This system of incentives and school organization works for France and the Netherlands.
In the United States, however, such reforms would be extremely controversial. Successful
implemetation of anyone of these reforms would be a major political undertaking?
Implementation of the whole package of reforms is probably politically infeasible. Yet the
analysis suggested that when, in Britain, just two elements of the package--mastery learning
with teeth and high relative salaries--were missing, achievement levels were substantially
lower than in the Netherlands and France. Consequently, from a practical policy point of
view the message is not very positive. France and the Netherlands have not discovered a
cheap and painless route to higher achievement.
The important lesson is that incentives--both their strength and structure--matter.
There are less controversial ways of increasing the rewards for academic achievement, so
the analysis should not cause American reformers to despair. Reforms tailored to the
American context have a greater chance of successful implementation than an effort to
replicate the French or Dutch systems of secondary education. A number of incentive based
approaches to reforming upper secondary education are discussed in Incentives to Study and
the Organization of Secondary Instruction which is available by writing to the Center for
Advanced Human Resource Studies, Ives Hall at Cornell University.
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1982 lEA 1991 lEA 1983 lEA Science 1991 IAEP Mathematics
Math Reading Age 14-15 Gain Level Gain
Age 13-14 AQe Adiusted (not adj Grd 5 Age 13 Age 9
X Correct Age Age 14 for age) to X Correct to
9 Mean (SO) Mean (SO) Grd 9 Mean (SO) Age13
France 53.9 526 533 (68) 64.2 (20.3)
Netherlands 57.1 494 523 (76) 65.8 (16.9)
England 47.1 --- --- 55.8 (16.4) 1.58 60.6 (21.4) 29.8
Scot land 48.4 --- --- 60.6 (20.3) 26.5
United States 46.4 543 528 (85) 54.8 (16.7) 1.13 55.3 (20.9) 25.4
1991 IAEP
Level
Age 13
% Correct
Mean (SO)
Science
Gain
Age 9
to
Age 13
Table 1
Achievement in lower Secondary School
68.6 (17.1) ---
68.7 (17.5) 18.7
67.9 (16.5) 20.8
67.0 (16.4) 17.2
Column 1 is a weighted mean percent correct for students in the grade where the majority have attained 13:00 to
13:11 years by the middle of the school year from the Second International Mathematics Study (McKnight et al 1987,
p. 124). The French, English, and American students all had the same mean age, 14.1. Mean age was 14.0 for
Scotland and 14.4 for Netherlands. Adjusting for the greater age of the Outch students would have lowered their
percent correct by about 2 points. Column 2 and 3 are the age adjusted means and standard deviations of the
overall reading score in the 1991 lEA study. Column 4 & 5 is the percent correct and standard deviation for 9th
graders (Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992, p. 55 & 74). The lack of adjustment for age differences has little effect
on comparisons between Netherlands and the U.S. because the mean age in The Netherlands was only 3 months greater
than in the U.S. The English students are a whole year and one month younger than the American students. If
students of equal age had been tested English achievement levels would probably have been about half way between
Outch and American levels. Column 6 is the differential in standard score units between 5th graders and 9th
graders on the test given in the Second International Science Study sponsored by the International Association for
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement. Columns 7. 8. 10 and 11 are the mean percent correct and standard
deviation from the 1991 IAEP study of mathematics and science achievement of 13 year olds (IAEP, 1992a 1992b).
Columns 9 & 12 are the increase in the percent correct on items commonto the tests given to 9 and 13 year olds.
France
Netherlands
Belgium 50.0 10 20
Finland 60.6 15 14 37.9 14 2.0 35.9 16 1.0 50.2 41 2.0 3.1
Norway 54.1 10 5.0 44.3 6 5.0 55.4 4 5.0
England 59.8 6 21 62.4 6 5.1 69.3 5 5.2 62.4 4 5.2 7.2
Scotland 42.8 18 17
Uni ted States 39.8 12 14 45.3 1 5.0 37.7 2 5.0 38.1 12 5.0 2.8
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Table 2
Achievement at the End of Upper Secondary School
1982 lEAKat~t1cs 1983 lEA Science--Final Year of Upper Secondary School
Final Yr. of Sec. Sch.
Percent X Age XTime
Correct Group Math
Physics
Percent X Age Hrs/
Correct Group Week
Chemistry
Percent X Age Hrs/
Correct Group Week
Bioloqy Total
Percent X Age Hrs/ Science
Correct Group Week Hmwk
Column 1 is a weighted mean percent correct for students in the final year of secondary. school from the Second
International Mathematics Study (McKnight et al 1987, p. 124). The mean age was 17:8 for the US. 18:1 for England,
16:9 for Scotland, 18:6 for Finland and 18:3 for Belgium. Column 2 is the share of the age cohort in advanced
mathematics courses included in the study. Column 3 is the share of school time spent in mathematics classes.
Columns 4, 7 & 10 give the percent correct for students studying each science subject in the final year of
secondary school. Column 5, 8 and 11 are the proportions of the age cohort taking each science subject in the
final year of secondary school [for the U.S. it is the share of students taking their second year of the subject].
Columns 6, 9 and 12 are the number of hours per week spent in classes in each science subject. (Postlethwaite and
Wiley, 1992, p. 6, 36, 37 & 69). The mean age was 17:5-17:10 for the U.S., 18:0 for England, 18:7 for Finland, and
18:11 for Norway.
FT Upper Sec. StudentsfTheoretical Age Group' 84.9% 91.1% 76.9% 90.2%
Enrollment Rate at age 172 79.3% 79.2% 52.1% 89.0%
2 63.1% 59.7% 33.1% 60.4%Enrollment Rate at age 18
Secondary Diplomas Awarded/Populjtion 84.5% 56.9% 65.1% 80.6%
of Theoretical Completion Age
Nether
France -lands
United United
Kingdom States
Table 3
SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND COMPLETION RATES
,
DECO, Education at a Glance, 1992, p. 77.
2 DECO, Education in DECO Countries. 1987-88, 1990, table 4.2.3 DECO, Education at a Glance, 1992, p. 97.
Table 4
EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL
Nether United United
France -lands Kingdom States
Public Expenditure Der Secondary School Student'
Relative to GDPper worKer 9.0% 7.2% 9.0% 10.5%
Relative to GDPper capita 22.5% 17.7% 20.4% 22.4%
Secondary School Students/Teachers2 13.4 20.0 16.5 15.8
Share of NonTeaching Staff] 26 % 16 % 51 %
, DECD, Education at a Glance, 1992, p. 77.
2 The ratio of the number of full-time-equivalentpupils enrolled in secondary schools to the number of full-time-
equivalent secondary school teachers taken from DECD (1992, Table P16).
3 Share of all staff employed in publicly funded schools and ministries of education that are instructional staff from
Table P9.e of DECD (1992). The non-teaching staff includes administrators at all levels, custodial staff, bus drivers,
clerical workers, nurses and counselors. Staff providing continuing vocational training, apprenticeship training, art
and music schools not under departments of education were excluded from both the numerator and denominator of
the ratio.
Table 5
TEACHER COMPENSATION AND CONDITIONS OF WORK
Nether-
France 1ands
Teacher Compensation/Compensation of All Employees'
Lower Sec. Teacher--Starting .95 1.12
Mid Career (15 yrs) 1.44 1.58
Upper Sec. Teacher--Starting
Mid Career (15 yrs)
1.06
1.61
Class Size2
Lower Secondary
Upper Secondary
Teacher Class Contact Hours/Week3
Primary School
Lower Secondary School
Upper Secondary School
24
29
27
20.2
15.1
176Teacher Days per year4
1.39
2.32
28
24
27
24.2
24.2
190
Eng-
1and
.87
1.63
.87
1.63
16
16
27
22
22
195
Scot-
1and
.91
1.61
.91
1.61
20
15
25.5
23.3
23.3
195
Un;tet.:
States
.86
1.33
.86
1.33
26.8
25.6
30.5
20.8
22.9
185
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------, Compensation of secondary teachers was calculated by multiplying their salary by the ratio of compensation to
wages for manufacturing workers. This estimate of teacher compensation was then divided by average
compensation of all workers. The figure for French upper secondary teachers is a weighted average of salaries
for Agrege (20%) and others (80%). (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, pp. 73, 74, 90 & 91).
2 Mean number of students in each class. (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, Table II.2.)
3 Mean number hours teaching a class per week. (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, Table 11.3.)
~ Mean number of workdays for teachers. (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, Table 1l.4.)
Table 6
STUDENT TIME--INSTRUCTION AND HOMEWORK
Total Hours of Instruction/Year
Primary Sch.-1971 (FISS)
5th Grade in 1982 (SISS)
4th Grade in 1991 (lEA Read)
Secondary Sch-1971 (FISS)
9th Grade in 1982 (SISS)
8th Grade in 1982 (SIMS)
9th Grade in 1991 (lEA Read)
Age 13 in 1991 (IAEP)
Hours of Homework in All Subjects
Hrsjwk--8th Grade in 1982 (SIMS)
Hrsjwk--Time Diary in 1980 (ISR)
HmwkGT 2 hrsjday-Age 13 (1991 IAEP)
Hrs/Wk on Lanquaqe Arts-4th Grade--IEA
Time Devoted to Mathematics
Math Share in 8th Grade (1982 SIMS)
Hrsjwk Math Instr-Age 13 (1991 IAEP)
Hrsjwk Math Hmwk--Age 13 (1991 IAEP)
Time Devoted to Science
Science Share--5th Grade (1971 FISS)
Science Share--5th Grade (1982 SISS)
Science Share--9th Grade (1971 FISS)
Science Share--9th Grade (1982 SISS)
Hrsjwk Science Instr-Age 13-1991 IAEP
Hrsjwk Science Hmwk-Age13-1991 IAEP
Yrs with Same Teacher-Grd 4 (1991 lEA)
Nether-
France 1ands
918
840
775
1187
1030
1073
8
55%
9hrs
12%
3.83
1.93
8%
8%
2.90
.68
2.4
1040
975
1120
1007
1000
1092
7hrs
10%
2%
7%
25%
1.7
Eng-
land
900
984
900
1025
896
960
5
30%
13%
3.17
1.27
3%
4%
8%
10%
3.23
.97
Scot-
1and
1040
1080
1067
1031
5 3
United
States
900
1070
954
900
1141
1008
792
1003
5
3.5
30%
1lhrs
14%
3.80
1. 52
7%
10%
10%
20%
3.88
1.06
.8
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15%
14%
3.50
1.00
3%
5%
3.00
.65
Sources: FISS refers to First International Science Study, Passow, Noah, Eckstein
and Mallea, 1976, p. 262 & 268. SISS is the Second International Science Study,
Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992, 14-33. SIMSis the Second International Mathematics
Study, Robitaille and Garden, 1989, pp. 36 & 79. IAEP is the International
Assessment of Educational Progress, 1992a & 1992b. lEA means it is taken from
Lundberg and Linnakyla (1992, 20-25) analysis of the 1991 International Association
for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement study of Reading.
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ENDNOTES
1. McKnight et al. The Underachieving Curriculum, Champaign, Ill: Stipes Publishing Co. 1987, p. 124.
The target population was all students in the grade (year level) where the majority have attained the age
of 13:00 to 13:11 years by the middle of the school year. By the spring of the year when the test was
taken, the mean age of the students was 14.1 for France, England and the United States, 14.0 for
Scotland and 14.3 for the Netherlands.
2 . International Assessment of Educational Progress, Learning Mathematics, 1992.
3. T. Neville Postlethwaite and David Wiley, Science Achievement in Twentv-Three Countries, London:
Pergammon Press, 1992. The target population for the study was supposed to be all students aged 14.00
to 14:11 on the specified date of testing OR all students in the grade where most 14 year olds are found
on the specified date of testing but some countries obtained permission to use older samples. The
English students tested were considerably younger (14.2 years old) than students in the U.S. (15.3 years
old) and the Netherlands (15.6 years old). If science scores are adjusted for age, England would
probably rank ahead of Singapore, Israel, French Canada, Norway and Poland and thus rank somewhere
in the middle of the distribution of countries.
4. International Assessment of Educational Progress, Learning Science, 1992.
5. Robert Thorndike, Reading Comprehension in Fifteen Countries, New York: John Wiley, 1973.
6. Warwick Elley, How in the World do Students Read?, International Association for the Evaluation of
Educational Achievement, 1992, p. 14 & 24.
7. OECD, Education at a Glance, 1992, p.97. If GED certificates were counted as diplomas, American
secondary school graduation rates would be higher. But the labor market does not view the GED as
equivalent to a high school diploma. GED certified high school equivalents are paid 6 percent more
than high school dropouts but 8 to 11 percent less than high school graduates. Most GED test takers
spend little time preparing for the exam. The median test taker spent 20 hours preparing for the exam
and 21 percent did not prepare in any way. Their ASVAB test scores are above those of other high
school drop outs but significantly below those of high school graduates who do not go to college.
(Cameron and Heckman 1993). Janice Laurence (1983 Table 1) found that their attrition rates from
the military were equal to those of high school dropouts and twice the rates of high school graduates.
Hence it is not appropriate to count GED certificates along with high school diplomas.
8. Since, vocational education is more expensive than traditional academic courses, providing vocational
education through schools as is done in Sweden, Holland, France and the United States raises costs.
Dual systems of education like the German, Austrian and Swiss systems arrange for employers to
provide most of the vocational instruction and thus place lower demands on the taxpayer. In 1980,
German employers invested an average of $6000 per year in the training of each apprentice they took
on as part of the dual system of vocational training (Noll et al. 1984). The German government
estimates that private expenditure on education of youth (almost all of which is employer spending on
apprenticeship training of secondary school students) is equal to 1.9 percent of GDP (OECD 1992, Table
PI). This implies that German employers account for nearly half of the nation's spending on secondary
education and that Germany spends about 60 percent more on students participating in secondary
education than the U.S. does.
51
Draft 1:00PM 11/9/93
Not for Quotation
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
52
The share of school district expenditure that goes for instruction is 56 percent in Milwaukee Wisconsin
and 55 percent in the District of Columbia (Fischer 1990; KPMG Peat Marwick, 1989). Howard
Nelson's (1990) examination of this issue concluded that teacher compensation was between 45.5 and
53.5 percent of current expenditures in the U.S. These ratios are higher in most other OECD countries.
The mean for OECD countries reporting this statistic was 62 percent (OECD 1992 Table P5). Ratios
of teacher compensation to total expenditure are not available for France, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, however.
Ministere de l'Education Nationale et de la Culture, Reperes and References Statistiques sur lcs
enseignmements et la formation. 1992 Edition, p. 205 & 206.
Since many countries fund pensions and medical insurance through mandated social security taxes, it
is essential to include both voluntary and compulsory contributions for these purposes in the
measurement of teacher compensation. Compensation of secondary teachers was calculated by
multiplying their salary by the ratio of compensation to wages for manufacturing workers. This estimate
of teacher compensation was then divided by average compensation of all workers. (Nelson and O'Brien,
1993, pp. 37, 74 & 93).
The salaries of British teachers rise more slowly than in other occupations, so 5 years after graduating
their salaries are 35 percent below accountants, 32 percent below computer programmers and systems
analysts and 22 percent below physical scientists. The gap is even larger in the U.S.
Bac Exams in mathematics, history/geography and and French are set and marked by 23 regional
academies. School based assessments are used for other subjects (Madeus and Kellaghan 1991, p. 17).
The Ministry of Education sets an exam which has both essay and multiple choice components. The
multiple choice component which represents half the written paper is graded centrally. With the aid of
a marking scheme supplied by the Ministry, the essay component is marked by the student's own teacher
and by a teacher from another school. Oral components are administered by the student's teacher.
The year prior to Hollingshead's arrival in town, the "Special College" scholarship had gone to Willa
Cross, the daughter of a well to do Elmtown family, rather than Joe Brummit, a carpenter's son. In the
view of an upper class male:
In my view she should not have received that scholarship. She kept that Brnmmit boy from going
to college. Joe Bnmzmit is a brilliant boy, and I think in many ways he was brighter than Willa
Cross. My own personal opinion is that Henry Cross had his nerve to let Willa accept that
scholarship if her work didn't actually justify it (p. 181).
The superintendent of schools commented on this incident as follows:
Henry Cross put a lot of pressure on me to see that Willa got the things they thought she should
have. Henry Cross is a funny Fellow, and it's taken me a long time to learn how to get along with
him.
[The Superintendent sat for a minute or two, leaned back in his chair; then went on ill .a
whimsical way.]
I used to be a refonner alld stood for strict ideals, but as I've grown older I've learned you have
to give a lot and take a lot in this business. I don't mean to say I have abandoned all principles,
but you have to work with people, and so at times you just have to wink at things (p. 183).
Publishing data on proportions of students meeting state targets on standardized tests probably speeds
the process by which real improvements in a school's performance influence it's local reputation.
However, other indicators such as SAT test scores, proportions going to various types of colleges and
the socioeconomic background of the students tend to be more prominent. In Ithaca, New York, for
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example, the promotional literature of the high school focusses on SAT scores, National Merit
Scholarship awards, college attendance rates and AP test results, not the results on State mandated
proficiency exams. Only the AP test results arc directly relatcd to the quality of tcaching at the school.
17. Analysis of data on out of cachement school selections for the Fife LEA found that the Type B schoo!
effect estimates (measures of how well each school does compared to others serving pupils of similar
ability and social background) are significantly and substantially higher at the schools selected by parents
choosing to leave their cachement area. Douglas J. Willms and Frank Echols, "Alert and Inert Clients:
The Scottish Experience of Parental Choice of Schools." Economics of Education Review, Vol 11, No.
4, 1993,339-350. My summary sentence sounds different from Willms and Echols summary of their own
results because they unaccountably base their conclusions on estimates of school effects from models
which did not control for the pupil's ability when entering secondary school and which they acknowledge
are biased. Luckily they also present results based on correctly specified models with controls for initial
ability in Table 3 of the paper.
18. In the U.S. minimum competency tests are taken in ninth or tenth grade and most students pass them
on the first sitting. Thus for the great majority of students, such exams have no further effect on
incentives to study. Incentives effects are focused on the small minority who fail them on the first
round.
19. Mark Tucker (1993) proposes establishing a single Yea-nay Certificate of Mastery representing a "truly
world class standard" that "everyone is expected to meet." He argues that everyone could be brought
up to this high standard by varying "the amount of instructional time in the day, week and year so that
students who need more time to reach the standard have that time along the way, not just at the end
of their career as a student." Most would attain this certificate at age 16 or earlier, some would take
longer. The incentive effects of such a scheme will depend on its design and the size of the rewards for
completing the Certificate. They will be very powerful if (1) assessment is external (ie. external
examiners, not the classroom teacher, set and grade the exams and judge the portfolios that establish
that the standard has been achieved) and (2) students who fall behind are compelled to devote
additional time to study (either after school, during the summer or by repeating the grade) and (3) the
increment in classroom time is substantial--at least 300 hours per year for some students. The possibility
of losing free time generates powerful incentives to work hard in regular classes. If, however,
participation in additional study time is optional, the incentive effects will probably be modest. Having
a Certificate of Mastery would probably raise average earnings by only 4 to 8 percent and this is
probably not enough to motivate most failing students to spend an additional 300 hours a year in
classroom study. One could make the rewards greater by requiring school attendance until the
Certificate is obtained and by making it a requirement for obtaining a high school diploma. This,
however, generates political pressures to dilute the world class standard of the certificate.
20. In the U.K., access to 6th form programs preparing for university, vocational technical programs of
various kinds and employment depend on the student's performance on the GCSE and Scottish lowcrs.
Since A level results are not available at the time initial university admission decisions are made, GCSE
results influence which university and which field of study a student is admitted to. In the Netherlands
the passing standard is high, but exceeding it by a large margin generates few rewards because the
external exam results are only part of the student's overall grade and access to the most popular
university fields of study is on a first-come first-serve basis. In addition, there is much less variation in
the quality and reputation of Dutch universities than of British universities.
.
21. The Dutch word for redoubler is blyven zitten (verb) and zittenblijvers (noun). The literal translation of
this word into English is "to stay in one's seat."
22. H. D. Lewis, The French Education System, p. 3.
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Ministere de I'Education Nationale et de la Culture, Reperes and References Statistiques sur les
enseignmements et la formation. 1992 Edition, p. 77, 93 & 99.
Ministere de I'Education Nationale et de la Culture, Reperes and References Statistiques sur 1es
enseignmements et la formation. 1992 Edition, p. 79, 91 & 99.
Some writers argue that tracking--assigning students to or letting them select courses of differing levels
of rigor--causes low achievement and propose instead to require everyone to take the same subject in
heterogeneously grouped classrooms. The evidence for this position, however, is weak. Slavin's (1988)
review of the literature on tracking in secondary school found no effects of tracking on mean
achievement levels. The Asian and European systems whose students regularly outperform American
students have much more pervasive tracking systems than the U.S. It is neither feasible nor desirable
for all senior high school students to take the same set of courses. While many nations have a common
curriculum with no tracking in elementary school and lower secondary schools, no country requires all
senior secondary students to take the same courses. Some students will want to pursue subjects like
mathematics and science in greater depth and rigor than others. Some students will want to concentrate
on technology not pure science. Some courses and programs will be easier than others and in a free
society students and their parents will inevitably be able to choose between more and less demanding
courses or programs. The kernal of truth in the anti-tracking literature is the observation that taking
undemanding courses (ie. setting easy goals) results in lower achievement. What is distinctive about
American schools is the lack of clarity about which track/program you are in and the consequent lack
of rewards for pursuing a more demanding educational program. Low American achievement levels are
not caused by the existence of courses of different rigor. They are caused by students avoiding
demanding courses and the willingness of teachers to lower the passing standard of their course when
a large share of students do not do the work or fail to learn the material.
For example, selective colleges give preference to students who take Advanced Placement courses.
Seniors applying to selective colleges are aware of this and often sign up for AP classes. The AP exams
come after colleges announce their admission decisions, however, so many students do not put the
required energy into the course and decline to take the AP exam when the time comes. In Britain,
colleges base their admissions offers on GCSE results and teacher predictions of how the student will
do on her A levels. If the student does not achieve the A level grades that are predicted, the student
may find that their admission to the specific university program is cancelled. Even though teacher
predictions of A level grades are decidedly optimistic, few schoolleavers suffer this fate. Nevertheless,
the possibility is enough to keep British students studying hard up through the A exam.
Surveys of college admission officers suggest they have recently increased the weight they attach to
taking rigorous courses in high school and doing well in these courses. Grades in high school have
always been the number one consideration. Standardized test scores have now become the second most
important consideration displacing class rank. Class rank is becoming less important because an
increasing number of high school are refusing to calculate class rank. (National Association of College
Admission Counselors, 1993, as reported in the October 23, 1993 Ithaca Journal).
FRENCH SECONDARY EDUCATION
Outcomes--French students have high levels of achievement.
Numbers Graduating: The ratio of secondary school diplomas to 18 yr olds is 85%
(compared to 75% in the U.S.).
Reading: French 9 year olds were ranked 4th and French 14 year olds were ranked
second on the 1990/91 lEA study of Reading achievement in 32 countries (23 of
which are industrialized),l Note that age is held constant so the high rates of grade
. repeating in France do not improve it's mean scores.
Mathematics: French 13 year olds ranked number 3 in the world (behind Japan and
Netherlands) in a 1981/82 lEA study of achievement in 20 countries (17 of which
were industrialized). The U.S. was ranked 14th in this study.2 In the IAEP study
in 1991, France ranks 6th of 16 industrialized nations studied behind Korea, Taiwan,
Switzerland, Russia and Hungary and ahead of Israel, Canada, England, Scotland,
Ireland, Slovenia, Spain. the U.S (a gap of about 1/2 of a U.S. standard deviation)
and Portugal.3
Science: France is in the middle of the league table in science, significantly above
Ireland but significantly below Korea, Taiwan and Switzerland.
Inputs--9.6 % of students are immigrants. Half of the immigrants are from North Africa.
6 % of students are from homes where French is not spoken, the same as the U.S.
Time in School-19914
France
United States
England
Switzerland
Northern Italy
Canada
Taiwan
Korea
Instruct
davs/Yr
174
173
192
207
204
188
222
222
Minutes
per day
370 min
338 min
300 min
305 min
289 min
304 min
318 min
264 min
Hours
per year
1073 hr
974 hr
960 hr
1052 hr
982 hr
952 hr
1176 hr
976 hr
Homework
GT 2 hrs/day
55 %
30 %
29.5 %
20.5 %
78.5 %
26.5 %
42.5 %
39.5 %
HISTORY
French education has a glorious tradition dating from Napoleonic times, but it has
historically been slow to change. Albert Camus said in 1946:
"The world is changing and with it both people and France itself. Only
French education remains the same. So we teach our children to live and to
think in a world which has already passed away.5
In 1946 only a small minority continued their education beyond primary school and
secondary education was dominated by classical studies and mathematics. Only 5 percent
of the age cohort obtained the Baccalaureate, the secondary school diploma which allowed
a student to enter university.
Starting in 1959 France made a mighty effort to "democratize" schooling. Prior to
1958, the party divisions endemic in the 4th Republic had prevented major reform of
education. One of the first acts of the new regime headed by Charles DeGaulle was an
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ordnance extending compulsory schooling from age 14 to age 16. Prior to that date only 10-
20 percent of the children of farmers and workers stayed in school beyond age 14 while 80-
90 percent of the children of professionals and managers were continuing beyond that age.
Structures of secondary schooling have been radically modified, - new
- pedagogical methods have been devised for making school more attrractive
to those ill-prepared for study, and plans have been adopted for continuing,
or adult education The slow steady erosion of the paramountcy of the
classical curriulum to the advantage of the technical and scientific--biologivcal,
physical and human--subjects is perhaps the most obvious sign of movement
away from a pedagogy of "cultivation" toward "specialized and expert
schooling."6
Post 1959 Reforms
* The introduction of comprehensive state subsidy of private (primarily Catholic)
schools. Teachers in private schools are paid by the government on the same salary
scale as the public sector. This change in effect broke the public monopoly in the
provision of subsidized schooling and gave parents the ability to choose the school
their child attended. The private sector now accounts for 13.9 percent of primary
school pupils and 21 percent of secondary school students.
* Adaptation of education to the needs of technology. The Brevet de Technicien was
upgraded to a status equivalent to the Baccalaureat.
* Tried to democratize schooling and tailor it to the aptitude and taste of the
individual. No longer would everyone be forced into a single classical model. A two
year observation cycle was established at the beginning of lower secondary schooling
after which the Orientation Council, the Conseil de Class, would recommend to
parents what type of study was appropriate to the talents of their child. Parents were
free to reject this recommendation and have their child take a public examination
testing the aptitude of the child.
High Standards have been maintained despite the rapid expansion. It is said that the
French are "attempting to apply to a majority of pupils those criteria of success originally
drawn up for a minority"? Rather than lowering standards in current programs they have
started new programs in economics and social science, technology and vocational subjects
and tried to give these programs prestige comparable to the old Bac lines. While the public
does not hold the professional lines in as high a regard, politicians and educational leaders
publicly treat them as equal in respect and prestige. They want well prepared youth to enter
the new vocational programs because they believe these fields are a key to French
competitiveness. The old high prestige study lines have expanded in response to student
demand.
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Structure of the French System
Almost all children 3, 4 and 5 years of age attend pre-elementary schools. Instruction begins
in earnest when they enter the 5 year primary school. This is fol1owed by 4 years of
comprehensive lower secondary schooling. Exihbit 1, Organigramme, d~scribes the
multiplicity of secondary and tertiary education pathways that exist in the French system.
General/academic education programs are indicated by white boxes; occupation specific and
vocational education programs are indicated by grey boxes. In the past large numbers of
students left general education at the beginining of eighth grade to enter occupation specific
training programs (the CEP and CAP). These programs have or .are being rapidly phased
out, so very shortly, occupational specialization will not be allowed until tenth grade, the
year following the completion of lower secondary schooling. Since the youth who choose
vocational education typically have repeated at least one grade, the occupation to prepare
for is generally not chosen until the youth is 16 or 17 years old.
College d'Emeignment Secondaire--Four year lower (premiere cycle) secondary school--
These four year middle schools were originally tracked generally into:
transition (to vocational studies), moderne and classique
Colleges became comprehensive (ie. mixed ability classes) after the 1974 Haby reforms.
Size and Organization---Colleges in the public sector have an average of 21 classes
(5 per grade level with an average of 24 pupils) and 510 pupils. One third of
students attend collefes with more than 700 pupils. Private colleges are smalJer; they
average 342 pupils. Students are formed into heterogeneous classes and take
almost all of their classes together. With the exception of the turnover caused by
repeating grades, the class remains intact the following year. Reshuffling of the
classes sometimes occurs at the beginning of the third year because some schools
allow specialization at this stage and because most students are starting a second
foreign language at this time. All students are required to take at least one foreign
language and 86 percent of the time the first foreign language is English. Latin is
taken by 28 percent of the pupils.
Admission to college is now based almost entirely on where you live. If too many
students from a neighborhood want to attend a particular school, the borders of the
district are revised or the school is expanded. Almost all lower secondary students
attend the local college. Schools in heavy demand (like the one's I visited) may have
some choice over those who replace students who leave. Class size at the most
popular schools appears to go to the upper limit allowed.
Homework is 1 hour per day in the first year (referred to as sixieme) of college. In
the final two years of college homework is 1.5 hours a day.
Lycee--3 year academic and technological Upper (Le Second Cycle) Secondary School--
Public Lycee generale and technologique are typicalJy quite large--33.4 classes (ie. 11
classes per grade with a mean of 31 pupils per class) and 1210 students on average.
80 % of public sector lycee students are in lycees with more than 900 students.
Private lycee are smaJJer--only 24 % of private Lycee students are attending schools
with more than 900 students and mean class size is 26.9
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Admission: Admission to Lycees with top reputations is quite competitive.
Reputations are largely based on past Bac results which are published in national
newspapers. Selection is based on the student's dossier (a thick file folder of grades
and teacher reports). Since students in college are not externally assessed, the
. reputation of one's college inevitably comes into play. The geographk-region from
- which lycee's must recruit are much larger than the colleges. The schools I visited
gave priority to students from their associated college,but they advised college pupils
they did not feel could make it to go elsewhere. This means that the chance of
getting into many of the better lycee is enhanced by living in the attendance area of
the college associated with this lycee. About half the intake into the two Lycee I
visited was from other colleges and there was also an intake at the end of the first
year to replace those who move away or switch to another school. The geographic
region from which they recruited these other students amounted to about one-quarter
of all of Paris. They had 150 applicants for 60 places.
Standards--The first year of Lycee (referred to as seconde) is a big challenge for
students. Expectations are much higher than in college. The pace is faster.
Homework is now 3 hours a day. Since the 1981 reforms all students in the Lycee
take the same courses during seconde. Specialization occurs in the second year of
Lycee (premiere). While three or four primary lines of study tend to be offered at
most lycee, other fields and sub specializations such as art and music are available
only at certain lycee. This means that one must choose one's lycee with one's
specialization in mind. Each line leads to a different package of Bac exams.
Most Lycees offer three or more lines of study and at most two or three classes in an
age group pursuing a particular line. Students take almost all their subjects with
other members of the class (mean size 31 pupils). Once they have selected their line,
a class will stay together from one year to the next with the exception of redoubling.
Classes within a line' are organized to keep those taking the same languages together.
Large choice of programs of study--
The major categories are:
General Bacs
A.Literature & Lang.
B. Economics & Soc. Sci
C. Math-Physics-Chem.
D. Biological Science
E. Math & Technology
Technical Bacs (BT)
F. Various Tech & Voc 0 0 11,081 30,043 44,545
G. Economics--Vocat. 0 0 17,465 43,054 77,578
H. Information Science 0 0 54 701 221
Professional Baccalaureats --.!) --9 ~ !) 46,112
Total 32,362 59;1.77 167,307 246,523 445,929
Share of the cohort obtaining a Bac 5% 10% 20% 30% 51%
Clearly, the number of students taking and passing the Bac has increased dramatically. The
pass rate was 71.6 % in 1992, significantly higher than the 65 % pass rate of 1975. In 1992
1950
17,186
0
7,474
6,747
955
Number of Baccalaureat Exams Passed1°
1960 1970 1983 1992
23,334 64,502 45,108 73,363
191 11,304 39,287 67,864
17,061 21,443 31,566 63,912
15,443 36,011 51,505 63,718
3,248 5,447 5,960 8,616
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623,171 students took the Bac Exam--a number that is roughly equal to the total number
of students in the terminal year of lycee and the 2nd year of Bac Professional programs in
the LEPs. The government has set a goal that 60 % of the age cohort prepare for and pass
a Bac exam by the year 2000. It appears likely to reach this goal since the share of the age
cohort obtaining a Bac has risen from 43 to 51 percent in just two years since T990. NOt aJI
of this rise is due to the introduction of the Professional Bac; the share getting a general or
technological Bac rose from 40.8 % to 45.7 %.
The Mathematics-Physics-Chemistry line (C) is the most difficult, carries the greatest
prestige and keeps open the option of going to a preparatory school for one of the Grandes
Ecoles (elite post-secondary colleges comparable in prestige to Harvard). MATHEMATICS
IS KING OF THE CURRICULUM. It is the rigorous mathematics studied in C which
distiguishes it from other lines. By the end of tenninale year, students in C have covered
trigonometry, differentiation, integration, vectoral space, functions, limits, probability,
statistics (standard deviatio~ means), and matrix algebra. Despite the more difficult
curriculum, 80 % pass the Bac exam for C. This compares to a 63% pass rate in economics
(B). Admission to the C line within a lycee is highly competitive.
Study lines in France and many other European countries are similar to speciality based
schools-within-a-school magnets in the U.S. Even though students from different lines share
the same building and mix together in some subjects, the members of a class take most
subjects together and friendships develop primarily within their class and class norms are
often distinctive. The different lines have a tracking effect, but since they are based on the
student's choice of field of study (rather than a smart/dumb or high/low distinction), public
discourse about the lines by educational leaders and teachers treats them as equal in
respect. Lines are more than a response to different interests and types of talent among
students. They are also one of the ways European school systems deal with the fact that
some 15 year olds are willing and able to tackle much more difficult material than others,
while simultaneously trying to minimize the invidious distinctions between those who choose
more or less difficult programs of study. The fact that classes are formed around subjects
of study rather than a high/low student ability distinction, also helps maintain the morale
of the teachers of the less able students. Teachers of social studies (or a vocational subject)
may complain about their inability to attract the best students into their major, but their
belief in and love of their subject induces them set high standards and to do the best they
can with the students who specialize in their field.
The greater prestige of the C line inevitably induces some of the students who are good in
all subjects to select C because of the doors it opens rather than because of love for the
subject or talent. Critics often bemoan this behavior. I see nothing wrong with it. Math
has prestige both because it is viewed as difficult (there need to be rewards for taking on
difficult lines of study) and because it increases the probability of success in further
education. Mathematics is an essential tool in engineering, science, business and the socia]
sciences, so a strong mathematics background contributes to success in university. Most
countries have a surplus of people with advanced education in the humanities and the result
for these graduates is low wages and low probabilities of finding work that makes use of
what was studied in university. As long as the prestige hierarchy is sending signals which
correctly guide young people into fields where employment demand is strong and social
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benefits are high, there is no problem.
When, however, a society invests great prestige in fields such as classics which prepare one
only to teach the subject, serious problems are created. In the 1950s Latin or Greek was
reqJ..lired in the A line and the A line had great prestige. The result was that brtght students
felt they had to distinguish themselves in Latin or Greek. At that time the prestige signal
was directing students into paths that made little contribution to the economy and that
reinforced class distinctions. The elitist character of the 1950s Bac was reduced by adding
economics and social science lines, technical lines and now professional (vocational) lines.
Mentions on the Bac--22% of those who pass the Bac exam recieve a mention of some kind.
Fewer than 1 % recieve the top honor-Tres Bien. Bien, the second highest honor, is
obtained by 4 % and Assez Bien, the third highest honor, is obtained by 17 %. Fewer
mentions are awarded for technological Bacs than for general Bacs. Consequently, pursuing
the C line is not the only way to distinguish oneself; going for a mention in A, B or G is an
alternative.
Trends in Academic Standards--Literature (A) line--stable or down
Economics and Social Science (B) line--disagreement
Math and Physical Science (C) line---stable or up
Reforms being Implemented in 1993 and later
The program of study for students following A, B, C, D and E is to be the same in
the seconde, the first year of lycee, so as to postpone the selection of academic line
until the beginning of Premiere. In addition C, D and E are mergea (by having
otions within a new broader science line) thus increasing the amount of mathematics
taken by those pursuing the life science line. Students in the literature line will be
required to study two foreign languages, more philosophy than other lines, but not
required to study mathematics. Students in the economics and social science line will
take 3 hours of applied math in premiere and 4 hours in the terminal year. Students
in the science line will take 5 and then 6 hours of theoretical mathematics.
Lycee d"Enseignemenl Professionnel(LEP)--are upper secondary schools for vocational
subjects. Students prepare for three different types of external examinations: Brevet
d'Enseignment Professionnel (BEP), the Certificat d'Aptitude Professionelle (CAP), and the
Baccalaureat Professionnel. Public LEPs have on average 20.4 classes and 537 students.
Private LEPs average only 178 students. In the public sector, only 21 % of LEP students
are in schools with more than 700 students.ll LEPs are "therefore sometimes able to
create a feeling, if not of intimacy, at least of belonging, something which is absent from the
other types of tycee. ,,12
One year vocational programs during the 8th year of schooling that led to the
Certificat d'education professionnelle (CEP) were common after WWII, but are now
completely phased out. The 3 year Certificat d'Aptitude Professionelle (CAP) program which
began in the 8th year of school and finished which students completed at age 17 or 18 is
being phased out. It had 409,402 students in 1985, but only 86,744 in 1991/92. In its place
the government is pushing the 2 year Brevet d'Enseignment Professionnel or BEP (a more
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generic, less job specific vocational credential than the CAP) which begins in the 10th year
of the student's schooling and is typically completed when the student is 18 or more years
old. BEPs are available in over 50 different fields. Enrollment in these programs has risen
from 170,000 in 1970/71 to 486,198 in 1991/92. A smalJ number of students are obtaining
2 year CAPs. In 1990, the pass rates was 70.6 % on the 2year BEP and "65% on the
CAP. 13
In addition, in 1985 a 2 year program of vocational study was instituted which picks
up where the BEP and the CAP leave off and leads to a Baccalaureat Professionnel. By the
time students enter the second year of the Professional Bac course 55 percent of them are
20 years old or more.' The intention of this reform is to upgrade the prestige of the
vocational studies and to raise standards in vocational programs. Since the Bac is required
for admission to university, it also gives those who pursue a professional line the option of
continuing their education. The pass rate on the Bac Pro was 76 % in 1992.
RedoublemenJ
Repeating a grade, redoublement, is very common in primary schools, colleges and
lycee. In 1979 only 15 percent of those entering the first year of elementary school
were over age. Five years later, in 1984, 42 % of the first year class of lower
secondary school (college) were over age. In 1987, a further three years later, 50 %
the students in the final year (troisieme) of lower secondary school were over age.
Still another three years later, in 1990, 65% of students in the tenninale year of lyeee
were over the theoretical age. In other words, about half of the students who are in
the final year of an academic track high school have repeated at least one year of
school. Because those who redouble tend to shift over to vocational lines of study,
even higher in the students at professionallycee are over the theoretical age. In the
second year of BEP and CAP programs (presumably the 11th year of schooling), 93%
of students are over the theoretical age and 58% are more than one year over age.14
Trends in redoublement: College grade repeating rates were between 6.5 and 9.5 % in the
middle of the 1970s. They rose over the course of the next decade reaching 9.4 to
16.4 in 1985/86. In that year Lycees had redoublement rates of 17.8 % in seeonde,
12.7 % in Premiere and 19.9 % in tenninale. Government policy is to reduce grade
repeating and statistics indicate that it is having some success. In the two colleges I
visited, grade repeating has been restricted to year 2 (cinquieme) and 4 (troisieme)
year of college. In 1990/91, national redoublement rates for general and
technological programs were:
8.6% in sixieme of college (parents can veto)
11.0% in cinquieme of college
6.8% in quatrieme of college (parents can veto)
9.6% in troisieme of college,
15.9% in seconde of lycee
12.1% in premiere of lycee
18.4% in tenninale of lycee
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Vocational programs have lower grade repeating rates.
6.0% in the first year of 2 year BEP and CAP programs in LEPs
10.9% in the second year of 2 year BEP and CAP programs in LEPs
1.4% in the first year of the Bac Professional program
5.0% in the second year of the Bac Professional program15
Even top public lycees serving upper middle class communities have high grade
repeating rates (14 percent of Lycee Charlemagne's seconde class repeated). Some
are offered the chance of switching to one of the easier lines of study but prefer to
redouble in hopes of making it into C. Others may switch to another school at this
point in order to get into the C line. The teacher's "basic motivation is to help the
child himself, to ensure that the pupil is sufficientl~ well prepared so that he may
fully benefit from work at a more demanding level." 6 To the teachers redoublement
is a form of Mastery learning. When I asked how the students who must redouble
feel about it, I was told that they feel "dishonored." The desire to avoid this fate is
probably one of the reasons why French teenagers study harder than their
counterparts in Britain and the U.S.
Conseil de Class--In both Collegeand Lycee, decisions about placement of students are made
by the Conseil de Class. Each classroom of 25 or so students has its own Conseil
which meets at least once at the end of the year. Reforms which created these
conseil were a response to the 1968 general strike. The conseil includes parent
representatives (generally two) and the teachers of the primary subjects for the class.
The parent representatives on the conseil apparently tend to defer to the teachers.
For the sixieme and quatriemeyearsof collegethe conseil decision is advsiory only, the
parents must agree. Parental approval is not required in other years. If the parents
of a child disagree with the conseil's decision, they may appeal the decision to the
Proviseur (or principal). The proviseurs interviewed said that such appeals were rare,
but that some decisions had been reversed. Parents who lose the first round appeal
may take the issue to an appeals board which contains only one representative from
the school.
Choices at the end of Lycee
29,663 high achievers (median age 19) enter Classes Preparatoires aux Grandes Ecoles,
two year schools which prepare students to compete for the limited number of places
in the Grandes Eco/e5--small high prestige post secondary institutions specializing in
engineering and business which are the route into fast tract positions within business
and the civil service. The top lycee generally have a preparatory school attached to
them. Only 1/12th of those who apply to preparatory schools are accepted. Bac
results for French (which is taken at the end of premiere) and the reputation of one's
/ycee are important factors in that decision. Priority is not given to applicants from
the associated lycee. Mathematics competence is the key to doing well on the exams
for admission to the Grande Ecoles. This is the primary reason why the C line is
chosen by the best students.
107,552 enter Sections de Techniciens Superieurs (STS), selective 2 year programs
which train for specific occupational specialities.
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Universit)': Passing the Baccalaureat confers eligibility to enter university. Some
fields of study are over subscribed and numerus clausus has been introduced to ration
these fields. Admission decisions are made prior to the receipt of resuHs of the Bac
exams but they can be revised if the student does better (or worse) than expected on
the Bac. Factors considered when numerus clausus is operating are grades in first
. quarter and previous year, reports of teachers and the French Bac.
In the first two years, classes are extremely large and failout rates are substantially
above 50 percent. In the Economics program at Paris II only 6 percent of entrants
receive the maitris (a degree that normally takes 4 years). Students who fail out of
one field of study often try a different generally easier field of study. Fail out rates
are much lower for those who studied the C line in lycee. Studying economics and
social science (B) in lycee does not help because the curriculum is controlled by
geograhers, sociologists and political' scientists so the economics taught has little
mathematics and is not neo-classical.
Sports--Students are required to take two hours of physical education per year. The Lycees
I visited were urban and lacked large playing fields, but they did sponsor sports teams.
Discipline---The Proviseurs (school principals) I talked to reported they did not have
discipline probelms [note that the schools I visited served students from upper middle class
backgrounds]. They were, however, rather large encompassing 1700 students (including the
attached college and preparatory school) in the case of Charlemagne and 120 staff in the
case of Lycee Jean de la Fontaine. Fontaine had not had to suspend a student for four years.
Charlemagne had a disciplinary council made up of teachers, parents and students.
Absenteeism and lateness goes on the student's record. Discipline problems were reported
to arise only with teachers who "lack authority"--This trait was reported to be negatively
correlated with the academic demands that the teacher places on students.
Peer pressure: The proviseurs I talked to reported there was a small amount of peer pressure
against studying in college classes and none in lycee classes.
Teachers are employees of the Ministry of Education, not the school. Entry into the
profession is controlled by examinations. Educational requirements for lycee teachers are
higher than for teachers at primary schools and colleges. Salaries are determined by their
credentials, tenure and evaluations of their teaching performance made by inspectors. The
Lycee's proviseur evaluates the teacher's administrative efficiency but have no formal
involvement in the evaluation of teaching performance. The salary schedule is collectively
bargained on a national basis.
The ministry decides who is assigned to which school. Teachers are not moved unless
they seek a transfer. Openings are announced and all certified teachers who apply are
considered. Prized appointments tend to go to the teacher with greater tenure and good
teacher evaluations, so the better and more experienced teachers tend to end up at schools
serving upper middle class neighborhoods Gust as in the U.S. and Britain). The Lycee's
proviseur has no formal role in the selection of the school's staff. These features of the
French system effectively insulate teachers from local and parental pressures which might
cause them to dilute standards.
FRENCH EDUCATION 10
French secondary school teachers (particularly those in lycees) view themselves as "teaching
the subject not the pupiI." The pace of a lycee class is not slowed when some students are
having difficulty keeping up. The class as a whole must achieve the Bac standard and those
falling behind will be expected to repeat the year.
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